Working with Cancer: How the Law Can Help Survivors Maintain Employment by Hodges, Ann C.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 90 Number 3 
10-1-2015 
Working with Cancer: How the Law Can Help Survivors Maintain 
Employment 
Ann C. Hodges 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
Digital 
Commons 
Network 
Logo 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ann C. Hodges, Working with Cancer: How the Law Can Help Survivors Maintain Employment, 90 Wash. L. 
Rev. 1039 (2015). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol90/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
04 - Hodges.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015 12:47 PM 
  
1039 
WORKING WITH CANCER: HOW THE LAW CAN HELP 
SURVIVORS MAINTAIN EMPLOYMENT 
Ann C. Hodges* 
Abstract: Advances in cancer treatment are saving lives, but along with the benefits come 
challenges. Millions of cancer survivors of working age need to support themselves and their 
families. This Article looks at the impact of cancer on employment starting with the 
empirical evidence gathered by researchers affiliated with medical centers. This empirical 
research provides a base, not previously explored in the legal literature, for assessing the 
existing laws dealing with cancer and employment (or unemployment). Viewing the law 
through this lens, which reveals the complex relationship between cancer and employment, 
exposes both the promise and the weakness of existing laws and offers ideas about legal 
changes that would better meet the needs of cancer survivors and their families. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Faced with a cancer diagnosis, chemistry teacher Walter White, 
protagonist of the popular television show Breaking Bad, turned to the 
drug trade to provide financial security for his family.
1
 Dramatic 
potential notwithstanding, most cancer patients do not “break bad.” 
Instead they are more like Sarah.
2
 After working ten months for her 
current employer, Sarah was diagnosed with lung cancer, which requires 
regular chemotherapy treatments and surgery. Her employer, a hospital, 
has several hundred employees, many of whom are engaged in shift 
work. To accommodate her treatment, Sarah has been trading shifts with 
other employees to avoid working on treatment days, but her supervisor 
has objected and threatened to fire her for being unable to work her 
regularly scheduled shift. In addition, the supervisor has begun to 
                                                     
1. About the Show: Breaking Bad, AMC, http://www.amc.com/shows/breaking-
bad/exclusives/about (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). 
2. Sarah is not a real person but a composite of cases handled by a nonprofit organization that 
assists individuals with cancer and their families with legal issues arising from their cancer. See 
infra note 4 and accompanying text.  
04 - Hodges.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:47 PM 
2015] WORKING WITH CANCER 1041 
 
criticize her job performance, despite her stellar review after six months 
of employment. The stress from fear of job loss has compounded the 
stress from the cancer diagnosis. Like most employees, Sarah’s health 
insurance is through her employer. She is facing surgery and has only 
accumulated two weeks of paid sick leave, a generous amount 
considering her short tenure, which she has been saving for the surgery 
and recovery. She is ineligible for more, either by law or employment 
policy, because of her length of employment. Although the doctors have 
offered her hope that treatment will provide a good chance of survival, 
she is uncertain whether she will be able to return to full-time work 
within two weeks of the surgery. Sarah needs to support herself and her 
family now and in the future, and needs continued health insurance to 
pay for treatment. Sarah’s situation is typical of many cancer patients. 
Cancer is no longer a death sentence. As a result of significant 
advances in cancer treatment, individuals with cancer are living longer. 
In many cases, cancer is now a chronic disease rather than a fatal one. 
These advances in medicine, however positive, come with costs for the 
survivors and society. The treatments that preserve lives are often 
expensive. In addition to paying for treatment, individuals with cancer 
must continue to support themselves and their families during and after 
treatment. Indeed, as former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor discovered 
during her own cancer treatment, maintaining employment can assist in 
battling cancer: “As tired and stressed out as I was, I had a job that was 
hard and important and was always there for me to do.”3 
Despite the need to maintain employment and the benefits of doing 
so, many individuals with cancer or a history of cancer are either 
unemployed or underemployed. Because health insurance is tied to 
employment for many in the United States, the lack of employment may 
lead to inability to pay for treatment and necessary follow-up. Not 
surprisingly, unemployment leads to credit problems and bankruptcy. 
Accordingly, the changing face of cancer imposes both individual and 
societal costs. 
Not all cancers fit this picture, however. Cancer ranges from the basal 
cell carcinoma that is treated in one or two doctor visits to advanced 
liver cancer that is rapidly fatal. Moreover, even within cancer types, 
researchers are discovering that cancer is not one, but many different 
diseases. The treatment and effects vary widely. What unites most 
                                                     
3. Jess Bravin et al., For Some Justices, the Bush-Gore Case Has a Personal Angle—Scalia and 
Thomas Were Campaign Flashpoints; Two Owe Jobs to Clinton—A Son at Bush’s Law Firm, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 12, 2000, at A1, A14.1. Thanks to Louis P. Pfeffer for bringing this quote to my 
attention. 
04 - Hodges.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:47 PM 
1042 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1039 
 
cancers, however, is the long-term and life-changing consequences of 
the disease. Survivors live with continual follow-up, lasting effects of 
treatment, and the possibility and reality of recurrence and further 
treatment. 
As the medical profession has advanced in cancer treatment, the law 
has fallen behind in addressing the needs of cancer survivors. When 
cancer patients almost inevitably died, and rather quickly, the major 
intersection of law and cancer was in providing for the patient’s 
survivors after death. As survival becomes the norm, issues of health 
insurance coverage, employment, and disability benefits for the cancer 
survivor come to the fore. While the law addresses each of these issues 
in various ways, none are precisely tailored to the evolving needs of 
cancer survivors. 
Because cancer affects millions of Americans, this Article seeks to 
begin a dialogue about the best way for the law to address the needs of 
survivors and their families. The focus on cancer derives from extensive 
personal experience with the legal needs of cancer patients.
4
 Focusing on 
cancer is also appropriate because of the sheer number of individuals 
affected, the substantial anticipated growth in the number of survivors in 
the future, and the staggering cost of lost productivity resulting from 
cancer.
5
 But in many ways the issues discussed in this Article are not 
unique to cancer, as survival rates have increased for other chronic 
diseases such as HIV,
6
 diabetes, and heart disease, raising similar public 
policy issues at the intersection of law and medicine.
7
 Thus, this 
examination of cancer and law may provide lessons for other illnesses as 
well. 
                                                     
4. The author co-founded LINC, an organization designed to meet the legal needs of cancer 
patients. The Founders: Who Started LINC?, CANCERLINC, http://www.cancerlinc.org/ 
?page_id=2025 (last visited May 21, 2015). 
5. See infra notes 11–33. 
6. Although the number of individuals with HIV is much smaller than those with cancer, 
individuals with HIV have seen similar increases in survival rates and face some similar issues in 
employment. See Brent Braveman et al., HIV/AIDS and Return to Work: A Literature Review One-
Decade Post-Introduction of Combination Therapy (HAART), 27 WORK 295, 295, 299–301 (2006) 
(noting the approximately 850,000–950,000 individuals living with HIV in the United States and 
various barriers limiting their return to work); Caroline Palmer & Lynn Mickelson, Many Rivers to 
Cross: Evolving and Emerging Legal Issues in the Third Decade of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 28 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 455, 477–79 (2001) (identifying discrimination and the need for 
accommodation as issues for individuals with HIV and noting the importance of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, Family Medical Leave Act, Rehabilitation Act, and similar state laws in dealing 
with those problems). 
7. See Elizabeth Pendo, Working Sick: Lessons of Chronic Illness for Health Care Reform, 9 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 453, 455 (2009) (identifying the need to address chronic illness 
in proposals for health care reform). 
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This Article begins with a discussion of the scope of the issue, 
examining the prevalence of cancer, the increases in survival rates, and 
the impact of cancer on employment, as well as the effects of 
unemployment and underemployment of cancer survivors.
8
 Having 
explored the problem, this Article then moves to the normative goals that 
the law should seek to achieve for cancer patients. Finally, this Article 
focuses on two laws that are designed to preserve and promote 
employment of individuals with health conditions such as cancer: the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)9 and the Family Medical 
Leave Act (“FMLA”).10 As the Article considers the effects of these 
laws, it will apply them to Sarah, the hypothetical but typical cancer 
patient, as an example of their impact. 
After analyzing these laws, this Article concludes that while recent 
amendments to the ADA benefit cancer survivors, neither the ADA nor 
the FMLA as currently constituted is sufficient to provide the protection 
needed by individuals with cancer to enable them to maintain and obtain 
employment. Recommendations for legal changes that might provide 
better support follow. This is only the first step in an analysis of the 
variety of laws that impact the ability of survivors to support themselves 
and their families and maintain the health insurance coverage required to 
obtain the continuing treatment they need. 
I. THE NEW FACE OF CANCER 
In the United States alone, there are nearly 14.5 million cancer 
survivors.
11
 Almost 1.7 million people will be diagnosed with cancer in 
2015.
12
 Estimates are that the number of cancer survivors will double 
between 2010 and 2020.
13
 These increasing numbers result from 
                                                     
8. Definitions of “cancer survivor” and determinations of when a cancer patient becomes a 
survivor vary. See INST. OF MED., FROM CANCER PATIENT TO CANCER SURVIVOR: LOST IN 
TRANSITION 23–30 (Maria Hewitt et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter IOM REPORT]. For simplicity, this 
Article will use the National Cancer Institute’s Office of Cancer Survivorship definition, adopted 
from the National Coalition of Cancer Survivors: “An individual is considered a cancer survivor 
from the time of diagnosis, through the balance of his or her life.” Id. at 29. 
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012). 
11. AM. CANCER SOC., CANCER FACTS AND FIGURES 2015, at 1 (2015) [hereinafter FACTS AND 
FIGURES], available at http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@editorial/documents/document/ 
acspc-044552.pdf.  
12. Id.  
13. Michael P. Markowski, Three Essays on Cancer Survivorship and Labor Supply 6 (Dec. 
2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University) (on file with author). Other 
estimates vary, with one suggesting a more than thirty percent increase to eighteen million 
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improvements in the relative survival rate
14
 of many cancers. For all 
cancers diagnosed between 2004 and 2010, the five-year survival rate 
was about two-thirds.
15
As recently as 1960, only one quarter of those 
diagnosed survived for five years,
16
 and by 1975–77, it remained less 
than half.
17
 For some cancers the increase in survival rates is dramatic, 
while for a few the rate is relatively flat or even slightly decreasing.
18
 
Overall, however, the number of cancer survivors is growing rapidly 
because the most common cancers—breast, colorectal and prostate19—
have increased survival rates.
20
 Indeed, these cancers account for half of 
all survivors.
21
 These improved survival rates result from both earlier 
diagnosis and more effective treatments.
22
 Not only is the survival rate 
increasing, but the number of individuals diagnosed with cancer is also 
increasing. In the United States alone, new cancer cases exceed one 
million per year, and are expected to increase to more than two million 
per year by 2050.
23
 
As the number of individuals diagnosed and the survival rate increase, 
there are more cancer survivors of working age. Current estimates are 
that about forty percent of cancer survivors are between the ages of 
                                                     
American survivors. Donatus U. Ekwueme et al., Medical Costs and Productivity Losses of Cancer 
Survivors—United States, 2008–2011, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 505, 505 (2013) 
(reporting on Centers for Disease Control research). Regardless of the exact number it is clearly 
significant, affecting millions of Americans. 
14. This rate compares the survival of individuals with cancer to others of similar age, race, and 
sex without a cancer diagnosis. FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 51. 
15. Id. at 18. 
16. Guy Maytal & John Peteet, The Meaning of Work, in WORK AND CANCER SURVIVORS 105, 
105 (Michael Feuerstein ed., 2009).  
17. FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 18. 
18. For example, the survival rate of prostate cancer increased from sixty-eight percent in 1975–
77 to greater than ninety-nine percent in 2004–10 and for non-Hodgkins lymphoma from forty-
seven percent to seventy-one percent for the same time period. Id. For pancreatic cancer, the 
survival rate increased from three percent to seven percent, statistically significant but still very low. 
Id. For uterine corpus cancer the rate actually declined from eighty-seven percent to eighty-three 
percent. Id. 
19. IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 49, 54, 57. 
20. The increases in survival rates between 1975–77 and 2004–10 for these cancers are as 
follows: (1) Breast: seventy-five to ninety-one percent; (2) Colon: fifty-one to sixty-five percent; (3) 
Rectum: forty-eight to sixty-eight percent; and (4) Prostate: sixty-eight to over ninety-nine percent. 
FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 18. 
21. IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 45. 
22. FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 2.  
23. Richard J. Butler et al., Economic Burden, in WORK AND CANCER SURVIVORS, supra note 16, 
at 25. This estimate is based on both the increase in population and the aging of the population. Id. 
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twenty and sixty-four.
24
 As diagnosis and treatment continue to improve, 
the number of cancer survivors of prime working age will grow as well. 
This Article focuses on this growing population of survivors. 
II. CANCER AND WORK 
A. The Relationship of Cancer and Work 
The changing nature of cancer has focused the interest of health care 
providers and policy makers on survivorship.
25
 As aptly stated in the 
Institute of Medicine’s major report on survivorship, survivorship is “a 
medical and social condition with major economic implications.”26A 
recent study of cancer survivors by the Centers for Disease Control 
found the average productivity losses and medical costs per person were 
significantly higher for cancer survivors than for individuals without a 
history of cancer.
27
 A major component of the survivorship focus is 
work, for reasons impacting both individual survivors and the economy. 
The National Institutes of Health estimates the national cost of cancer at 
$263.8 billion, with more than half of that due to lost productivity 
resulting from both the effects of the illness and premature death.
28
 
Billions of work days are lost or affected by cancer.
29
 Additionally, 
employees may be deterred from job changes because of fears about the 
impact on health insurance, creating an economically inefficient result 
that prevents the best use of employee talents.
30
 Loss of income due to 
illness is a major contributor to bankruptcy in the United States.
31
 A 
                                                     
24. Markowski, supra note 13, at 7; see also IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 32 (indicating that in 
2002 thirty-eight percent of cancer survivors were between the ages of twenty and sixty-four). 
25.  IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 23–30 (describing the development of advocacy groups and 
establishment of the Office of Cancer Survivorship in the National Cancer Institute to focus 
research on survivorship as a result of the increase in survivors). 
26. Id. at 20. 
27. Ekwueme et al., supra note 13, at 506. 
28. Markowski, supra note 13, at 7. A study by Butler, Johnson, and Gubler reached similar 
results, finding that productivity losses from cancer, about $145 billion per year, were twice the 
direct cost of cancer treatment, about $74 billion per year. Butler et al., supra note 23, at 25, 69. 
29. Markowski, supra note 13, at 7. 
30. STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE OBJECTIVES: BRINGING 
WORKPLACE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY INTO FOCUS 60 (2009) (describing the deterrent effect of 
fear of loss of health insurance coverage in general as a “market failure that decreases the efficiency 
of the U.S. economy”). 
31. David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a 
National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 741 (2009), available at http://www.amjmed.com/article/ 
S0002-9343%2809%2900404-5/fulltext?refuid=S0002-9343%2809%2900525-7&refissn=0002-
9343 (finding that sixty-two percent of bankruptcies in 2007 were caused by medical reasons, 
 
04 - Hodges.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:47 PM 
1046 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1039 
 
cancer diagnosis significantly increases the likelihood of bankruptcy.
32
 
Additionally, the likelihood of home foreclosure increases significantly 
in the five years following a cancer diagnosis.
33
 These bankruptcies and 
foreclosures impose both individual and societal costs. 
While these productivity and financial losses are important to society, 
from an individual and family perspective, cancer and employment have 
a complex relationship. For some, work may be a source of normality 
and distraction from the disease, providing a psycho-social benefit to the 
patient.
34
 For others, work may be a necessity to maintain financial 
resources and the health insurance that provides access to essential 
treatment.
35
 But the security provided by continuing work may be 
unavailable to those whose cancer and its effects make working difficult 
or impossible.
36
 Among the effects of cancer and cancer treatment that 
may limit the ability to work are: the immune suppression effects of 
certain therapies that require avoiding close contact with people who 
might carry infectious bacteria; physical limitations, such as difficulty 
speaking, lifting, walking, or standing; cognitive or other mental 
limitations due to either brain cancers, metastases, or chemotherapy 
effects; depression; and fatigue.
37
 
                                                     
including significant medical costs, loss of income, and/or mortgaging a home to pay medical bills). 
The study found that most of the debtors were middle class, well-educated and homeowners and 
most had health insurance at the beginning of their illness. Id. More than a third of the families 
impacted suffered job loss, either the patient or a caregiver. Id. 
32. Scott Ramsey et al., Washington State Cancer Patients Found to Be at Greater Risk of 
Bankruptcy Than People Without a Cancer Diagnosis, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1143, 1143 (2013) 
(finding that cancer patients were 2.65 times more likely to file for bankruptcy than those without 
cancer and younger patients were more likely to file than older patients, perhaps because the latter 
had access to Social Security and Medicare benefits). 
33. Arpit Gupta et al., Cancer Diagnoses and Household Debt Overhang 4 (Columbia Law & 
Econ. Working Paper No. 514, 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2583975 (finding a 
sixty-five percent increase in the likelihood of foreclosure in the five years post-diagnosis). Those 
with more advanced cancers had an even greater risk of foreclosure. Id. The authors found that 
those with substantial equity in their homes did not have an increase in foreclosure rates, however. 
Id. 
34. See V.S. Blinder et al., Employment After a Breast Cancer Diagnosis: A Qualitative Study of 
Ethnically Diverse Urban Women, 37 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 763, 763 (2011); Maytal & Peteet, 
supra note 16, at 113; Corine Tiedtke et al., Experiences and Concerns About ‘Returning to Work’ 
for Women Breast Cancer Survivors: A Literature Review, 19 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 677, 680 (2010) 
(meta-analysis of six studies from three countries); supra note 3 and accompanying text (quoting 
Justice O’Connor’s statement regarding how her ability to continue her important work on the Court 
helped her cope with cancer). 
35. Maytal & Peteet, supra note 16, at 113; Tiedtke et al., supra note 34, at 680. 
36. See Pamela Farley Short et al., Employment Pathways in a Large Cohort of Adult Cancer 
Survivors, 103 CANCER 1292, 1292 (2005) (showing long-term effects of cancer on ability to work). 
37. Ekuweme et al., supra note 13, at 507; Maytal & Peteet, supra note 16, at 115.  
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Many of these effects last long after treatment is completed.
38
 And 
today some drug therapies for cancer continue for extended periods of 
time, prolonging the effects of treatment.
39
 For some patients, continuing 
work during treatment may make recovery more difficult by interfering 
with treatment protocols, while for others returning to work too quickly 
may exacerbate the effects of treatment, such as fatigue, impairing long 
term recovery.
40
 On the other hand, some patients may alter their 
preferences for time allocation as a result of cancer, preferring more 
leisure time to work where economically feasible, or changing to a more 
desirable job.
41
 
Patients who continue to work during treatment may gain more than 
income and insurance. Their commitment may solidify their 
employment relationship, making retention and promotion more likely in 
the future.
42
 Ceasing to work, even temporarily, may alter an employee’s 
career trajectory, making it more difficult to get desirable future 
employment.
43
 Working patients also may enjoy the social support of 
fellow employees.
44
 
This complex set of factors results in several possible employment 
outcomes for cancer patients and survivors. The individual may continue 
to work throughout treatment, recovery, and post-treatment survival. 
Alternatively, the individual may voluntarily cease employment at any 
point during this trajectory of survivorship, either as a result of problems 
in maintaining employment due to the cancer or in order to spend time 
on alternative pursuits deemed of higher value. The third alternative is 
that the employee is involuntarily terminated as a result of the cancer, 
for some unrelated reason, or a combination of the two. Finally, because 
cancer incidence increases with age, some employees may choose to 
retire, either because it has become a more attractive choice as a result of 
the illness or because of the difficulty of working combined with 
eligibility for retirement benefits to provide income. 
As is evident from the prior description of alternatives, the 
                                                     
38. Kathleen Oberst et al., Work Task Disability in Employed Breast and Prostate Cancer 
Patients, 4 J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 322, 323 (2010). 
39. IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 17. 
40. Joanna Pryce et al., Cancer Survivorship and Work: Symptoms, Supervisor Response, Co-
Worker Disclosure and Work Adjustment, 17 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION 83, 90–91 (2006); 
Tiedtke et al., supra note 34, at 680–81. 
41. IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 364; Tiedtke et al., supra note 34, at 681. 
42. Markowski, supra note 13, at 24. 
43. Cathy J. Bradley et al., Breast Cancer Survival Work and Earnings, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 757, 
777 (2002) [hereinafter Breast Cancer Survival]. 
44. IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 364.  
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employment status of the patient/survivor may vary over time as the 
cancer status changes. Other than binary employment outcomes, cancer 
may reduce voluntary job changes by employees because of concerns 
about insurance or discrimination or cause on the job employment 
problems such as harassment or discrimination.
45
 Additionally, 
employees may reduce or increase work hours or change jobs because of 
cancer and its effects.
46
 
The relationship of cancer and work may change based on the 
employee’s stage of survivorship. Like cancer, which is staged based on 
the individual’s medical condition,47 survivorship has stages or 
“seasons.”48 “Acute survival” starts with diagnosis and continues with 
treatment.
49
 This stage is characterized by fear and anxiety.
50
 The second 
season, “extended survival,” is the period of remission or the end of the 
initial, intensive course of treatment.
51
 During this phase, the individual 
is monitored closely and may have some additional treatment, depending 
on the cancer and its medical stage at diagnosis.
52
 The survivor is 
dealing with fear of recurrence and any residual physical effects of 
treatment such as fatigue, loss of strength, and perhaps loss of some part 
of the body.
53
 At the same time, the survivor is integrating back into 
daily life.
54
 The final season is “permanent survival,” which is 
considered a cure, but the mental and physical effects of cancer often 
remain with the survivor during this stage.
55
 Any recurrence of cancer 
                                                     
45. Id. at 369–70. 
46. Cathy J. Bradley et al., Breast Cancer and Women’s Labor Supply, 37 HEALTH SERV. RES. 
1309, 1320–23 (2002) [hereinafter Breast Cancer and Women’s Labor] (finding that women 
working after a breast cancer diagnosis work more hours per week than those without breast 
cancer); Anja Mehnert, Employment and Work-Related Issues in Cancer Survivors, 77 CRITICAL 
REV. ONCOLOGY/HEMATOLOGY 106, 124 (2011) (finding most studies in meta-analysis that 
analyzed work hours showed reduction in hours by cancer survivors with some studies showing 
significant job changes as well). Possible explanations for the increase in hours may be an effort to 
recover savings depleted by treatment or a renewed commitment to work as a result of the cancer. 
Id. at 1325. 
47. For a description of cancer staging, see FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 2–3, 17. 
48. IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 28. These “seasons” were first described by Fitzhugh Mullan, 
a founder of the National Coalition of Cancer Survivors in an article in the New England Journal of 
Medicine. Id. at 27–28. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
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will begin the seasons anew. Employment may be affected by the 
physical or mental and emotional impacts of the particular stage of 
survivorship. One who ceased working voluntarily or involuntarily may 
choose to return to employment at a later stage of survival. This 
relationship is reflected in the research on the determinants of 
employment, which is addressed in the next section. 
B. Determinants of Employment 
Medical researchers have investigated the determinants of 
employment for cancer patients and survivors to assess how employment 
affects, and is affected by, diagnosis and treatment. The goal of this 
research is to determine how to ensure the best medical outcome for 
cancer patients. The research also enables an assessment of the current 
legal protections and benefits for cancer survivors and a determination of 
whether they are sufficient to ensure that these survivors can support 
themselves and their families after diagnosis and obtain the necessary 
medical treatment for their condition. A review of the existing research 
follows. 
Cancer affects employment adversely in every stage of survival. 
Cancer survivors are less likely to be working than similar individuals 
without cancer.
56
 Such a relationship is not unexpected, given the serious 
health implications of cancer and cancer treatment.
57
 Cancer causes 
                                                     
56. A meta-analysis of a number of studies of cancer and employment found that “cancer 
survivors were 1.37 times more likely to be unemployed than healthy control participants.” Angela 
G.E.M. de Boer et al., Cancer Survivors and Unemployment, a Meta-Analysis and Meta-Regression, 
301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 753, 760 (2009); see also Breast Cancer and Women’s Labor, supra note 
46, at 1324–25 (finding that women with breast cancer are less likely to work than women without 
breast cancer even when controlling for health status); Cathy J. Bradley et al. Short-Term Effects of 
Breast Cancer on Labor Market Attachment: Results from a Longitudinal Study, 24 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 137, §§ 2, 5.2, 5.3 (2005) [hereinafter Short-Term Effects] (finding that women with breast 
cancer were less likely to work in the six months following diagnosis than a control group. Also, 
those who continued to work, worked fewer hours than the control group. This Article cites other 
studies showing declines in work); Butler et al., supra note 23, at 59, 67 (finding “cancer survivors 
on average never fully recover to their pre-cancer levels of employment” and specifically that the 
employment rate of colon cancer survivors is twenty percent lower than for others of similar age); 
Mehnert, supra note 46, at 122 (conducting a meta-analysis of sixty-four studies and finding that 
cancer survivors had lower rates of employment, although their employment increased over time 
after diagnosis. On average 63.5% returned to work). 
57. The meta-analysis found based on some of the studies that the disability risk was higher for 
cancer survivors, which might well explain the difference in employment rates. de Boer, supra note 
56, at 761. Further, unemployment rates are higher with certain cancer diagnoses, which correlates 
with the physical effects of the cancer and treatment. Id.; see also Short et al., supra note 36, at 
1292–93 (showing twenty percent of 1433 cancer survivors followed over time had cancer-related 
disabilities at follow-up, with half of those working despite the disability); Oberst et al., supra note 
38, at 326 (finding cancer-related disability rates in breast and prostate cancer survivors declining 
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greater work impairment than other serious medical issues.
58
 Research 
has also demonstrated, however, that many survivors return to work over 
time.
59
 The most drastic effects on employment occur in the first year 
after diagnosis, typically the acute survival stage.
60
 Nevertheless, many 
cancer survivors have some residual disability that affects their ability to 
work.
61
 A study of survivors with a wide variety of cancers showed that 
functional limitations affected survivors’ ability to work.62 Among the 
tasks that created some difficulty were heavy lifting, keeping up a pace 
                                                     
over time but still present for some patients eighteen months after diagnosis and negatively related 
to employment); Pamela Farley Short et al., Work Disability Associated with Cancer Survivorship 
and Other Chronic Conditions, 17 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 91 (2008) (finding cancer survivors had 
disability rates higher than the general population, but about the same as those with other chronic 
conditions). 
58. IOM REPORT, supra note 8, at 370–71. 
59. See Cathy J. Bradley & Heather L. Bednarek, Employment Patterns of Long-Term Cancer 
Survivors, 11 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 188, 193 (2002) (finding that of sixty-seven percent of patients 
working at their cancer diagnosis were working five-to-seven years later); Mehnert, supra note 46, 
at 122 (conducting a meta-analysis of sixty-four studies which showed steady increase in return to 
work by survivors over time); Evelien R. Spelten et al., Factors Reported to Influence the Return to 
Work of Cancer Survivors: A Literature Review, 11 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 124, 127–28 (2001). 
60. See Cathy J. Bradley, Absenteeism from Work: The Experience of Employed Breast and 
Prostate Cancer Patients in the Months Following Diagnosis, 15 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 739, 739–40 
(2006) [hereinafter Absenteeism] (finding thirty percent of breast and prostate cancer patients who 
were working prior to diagnosis were not working six months after diagnosis and those who 
continued to work worked fewer hours); Cathy J. Bradley et al., Employment and Cancer: Findings 
from a Longitudinal Study of Breast and Prostate Cancer Survivors, 25 CANCER INVESTIGATION 47, 
49– 51 (2007) [hereinafter Employment and Cancer] (finding breast and prostate cancer survivors 
were less likely to be employed six months after diagnosis, but at twelve and eighteen months after 
diagnosis, many had returned to work and employment was not lower than in a control group); 
Short et al., supra note 36, at 1296 (finding in study of 1433 cancer survivors that forty-one percent 
of males and thirty-nine percent of females stopped working during treatment but most would return 
to work within a year of diagnosis); Corné A. Roelen et al., Sickness Absence and Full Return to 
Work After Cancer: 2-Year Follow-up of Register Data for Different Cancer Sites, 20 PSYCHO-
ONCOLOGY 1001, 1001 (2011) (finding seventy-three percent of cancer survivors working before 
diagnosis fully returned to work after a median duration of 290 days and within two years of 
diagnosis, most had returned to work).  
61. Bradley & Bednarek, supra note 59, at 193 (finding that twenty-four percent of survivors of 
lung, colorectal, breast, and prostate cancer who were working at the time of their cancer diagnosis 
but were not working five-to-seven years later stopped working because of poor health or 
disability); de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 761; Employment and Cancer, supra note 60, at 51–52 
(reporting that breast and prostate cancer survivors indicated that cancer interfered with various 
physical and cognitive tasks required by their jobs twelve months after diagnosis); Short et al., 
supra note 36, at 1296 (finding twenty percent of survivors in cohort of 1433 reported some residual 
disability and eleven percent of survivors who returned to work after treatment left work for cancer-
related reasons in the next three years while nine percent of survivors who worked through 
treatment left work for cancer-related reasons within four years of diagnosis). 
62. Michal C. Moskowitz et al., Function and Friction at Work: A Multidimensional Analysis of 
Work Outcomes in Cancer Survivors, 8 J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 173, 177 (2014). 
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of work, concentration, learning new tasks, and analyzing data.
63
 A 
residual disability may cause job changes or reductions in hours and may 
require some accommodation by the employer. 
Researchers have analyzed the effects of cancer on employment to 
determine what factors impact whether survivors maintain employment 
during and after treatment, and whether survivors reduce or increase 
hours worked. Some studies have focused on particular cancers—
commonly breast and prostate—which have high survival rates,64 while 
others have studied all cancer survivors. Studies are often limited to the 
populations in particular geographic areas surrounding major cancer 
treatment centers, although a few have aggregated multiple studies. A 
number of factors appear to affect employment. Among them are the 
following: (1) type and stage of cancer; (2) physical and mental health 
during and following treatment, including both the impact of the cancer 
and the effects of treatment; (3) demographic factors such as race, 
ethnicity, gender, and age; (4) type of job; (5) source of health insurance; 
and (6) employer support and accommodation. The following sections 
analyze the impact of these factors as revealed by various studies. 
1. Cancer and Treatment Factors 
Not surprisingly, the type and stage of cancer has been shown to 
affect employment in many studies.
65
 Some cancers are more 
debilitating than others. Later stage cancers are more debilitating than 
cancers diagnosed at earlier stages. Lung cancer and most head and neck 
cancers are negatively associated with work, while testicular cancer, 
melanoma, and thyroid cancer appear to cause few work limitations.
66
 
Brain, bone, liver, pancreatic, rectal, and blood cancers also significantly 
reduce employment
67
 as do breast cancer, gastrointestinal cancers, and 
female reproductive cancers.
68
 Studies of prostate cancer and 
                                                     
63. Bradley & Bednarek, supra note 59, at 196.  
64. Breast cancer survivors comprise both the largest percentage of all survivors and the largest 
percentage of female survivors. Cathy J. Bradley et al., Does Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
Constrain Labor Supply Adjustments to Health Shocks? New Evidence on Women Diagnosed with 
Breast Cancer, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 833, 835 (2013) [hereinafter Employer-Provided Health 
Insurance].  
65. Mehnert, supra note 46, at 123 (meta-analysis of sixty-four studies showing type and stage of 
cancer affected probability of working). 
66. Butler et al., supra note 23, at 58; de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 757–58; Roelen et al., 
supra note 60, at 1003–04; Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 124, 126, 128. 
67. Butler et al., supra note 23, at 58; de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 757–58. 
68. de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 757–58; Employer-Provided Health Insurance, supra note 64, 
at 835; Spelten et al., supra note 57, at 126; Short-Term Effects, supra note 56, § 5.2. 
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employment show mixed results.
69
 Later stage cancers adversely affect 
work in most studies
70
 but not for all cancers; a study of Hodgkins and 
lymphoma patients showed no relationship between cancer stage and 
work.
71
 Survivors with a recurrence, metastasis, or second primary 
cancers have lower employment rates and work hours compared to the 
general population than survivors who are cancer free, although both 
groups suffer reduced employment for as long as two to six years after 
diagnosis.
72
 
The physical and mental effects of cancer and treatment also impact 
work, again a result that is not surprising.
73
 Cancer-related disabilities 
cause employees to leave the workplace.
74
 In a study of breast and 
prostate cancer patients, the type of treatment had the greatest impact on 
absenteeism from work for those who continued to work.
75
 Fifty-two 
percent of those receiving chemotherapy stopped working.
76
 Physical 
and psychological symptoms caused reduced hours or changes in their 
occupational role for survivors in another study.
77
 Some cancer 
                                                     
69. See Butler et al., supra note 23, at 52, 58 (finding higher unemployment for prostate cancer 
survivors); de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 758 (finding no higher risk of unemployment for 
prostate cancer survivors); Employment and Cancer, supra note 60, at 50–51 (finding reduced 
employment for prostate cancers six months after diagnosis but no statistically significant reduced 
employment twelve and eighteen months after diagnosis).  
70. Reynard R. Bouknight et al., Correlates of Return to Work for Breast Cancer Survivors, 24 J. 
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 345, 348–49 (2006) (finding women with advanced stage breast tumors had a 
reduced likelihood of returning to work); Short et al., supra note 36, at 1298; Spelten et al., supra 
note 59, at 128.  
71. Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 128. But see Short et al., supra note 36, at 1297, 1298 
(showing that Stage IV blood and lymph cancers adversely affected employment). 
72. John R. Moran et al., Long-Term Employment Effects of Surviving Cancer, 30 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 505, 509–10 (2011). 
73. See Mehnert, supra note 46, at 123–24 (showing impact of treatment on working). 
74. Bradley & Bednarek, supra note 59, at 193; de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 761 (meta-
analysis showing reasons for unemployment were “physical limitations, cancer-related symptoms, 
or both”); Oberst et al., supra note 38, at 326. In using the term disability here I use it as used in the 
studies, not as a legal definition of disability under any particular statute or disability plan. 
75. Absenteeism, supra note 60, at 743–44; see also Mahasin S. Mujahid et al., Racial/Ethnic 
Differences in Job Loss for Women with Breast Cancer, 5 J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 102, 109 
(2009) (finding more aggressive treatment associated with higher levels of absenteeism). 
76. Absenteeism, supra note 60, at 742. In another study, Hassett found that chemotherapy 
adversely affected employment of women with breast cancer. Michael J. Hassett et al., Factors 
Influencing Changes in Employment Among Women with Newly Diagnosed Breast Cancer, 115 
CANCER 2775, 2778 (2009) (finding women receiving chemotherapy had “1.8-fold greater risk of 
experiencing a change in employment versus women who were not receiving chemotherapy”). 
When age was considered, there was a statistically significant association for women over age fifty-
one, but not those age fifty-one and under. Id. 
77. John F. Steiner, The Impact of Physical and Psychosocial Factors on Work Characteristics 
After Cancer, 17 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 138, 140–41 (2008). 
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survivors, however, with an average of seven years post-diagnosis, 
worked more hours and had higher pay than a control group.
78
 
2. Demographic Factors 
Several studies have found that race and ethnicity are associated with 
employment and cancer.
79
 African-American women were less likely to 
remain employed following breast cancer diagnosis.
80
 Similarly, low-
income Latinas were less likely to be employed at six and eighteen 
months after a breast cancer diagnosis than low-income, non-Latina 
whites.
81
 Type of work, with more physical jobs associated with lower 
levels of employment, was a factor in the disparity, but did not fully 
explain the difference.
82
 The authors posited that lack of knowledge of 
lymphedema, a frequent complication of breast cancer surgery and its 
treatment, might be an additional causative factor.
83
 And another study 
found that independent of socio-demographic factors, Latina women 
were more likely to suffer unemployment as a result of breast cancer 
than white women, but found no similar difference between African-
American and white women.
84
 Researchers theorized that the differences 
might result from problems “navigating the health care system and in 
turn balancing work and treatment”85 and/or language barriers or other 
                                                     
78. Breast Cancer and Women’s Labor, supra note 46, at 1325; Breast Cancer Survival, supra 
note 43, at 769. The women in the study tended to be white, married, and well-educated, which may 
have affected the results. Women in that demographic are more likely to have jobs without physical 
demands that might limit the ability to work. See infra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. The 
women also may have been working more to replace lost income. Infra notes 93–99 and 
accompanying text. 
79. See Steiner, supra note 77, at 145; infra notes 80–86 (citing relevant Articles). 
80. Bouknight et al., supra note 70, at 348, 351; Cathy J. Bradley & Amber Wilk, Racial 
Differences in Quality of Life and Employment Outcomes in Insured Women with Breast Cancer, 8 
J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 49, 51, 58 (2014) (finding substantial reduced employment among 
African-American women after a diagnosis of cancer as compared to non-Hispanic white women 
after controlling for many job characteristics and insurance, leading to supposition that differences 
in treatment regimen or symptom control might explain the difference); Employment and Cancer, 
supra note 60, at 49; Hassett et al., supra note 76, at 2775. Another study found no statistically 
significant difference between white and African-American women in job loss following cancer 
after controlling for other socio-demographic factors, however. Mujahid et al., supra note 75, at 
106.  
81. Victoria S. Blinder et al., Return to Work in Low-Income Latina and Non-Latina White Breast 
Cancer Survivors: A 3-Year Longitudinal Study, 118 CANCER 1664, 1664, 1667 (2012). 
82. Id. at 1672. 
83. Id. at 1669. Lymphedema is a complication that causes lymph fluid to pool in the arm, 
resulting in swelling and sometimes pain. It is exacerbated by physical activity such as heavy lifting. 
84. Mujahid et al., supra note 75, at 106.  
85. Id. at 110. 
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factors not measured by the study such as “more isolated work settings, 
multiple employers, or temporary employment.”86 Research on age87 and 
gender
88
 as factors has found mixed results. 
A recent study discovered that more rural survivors than urban 
survivors take early retirement and that fewer rural survivors receive 
paid disability benefits.
89
 Because more rural workers have physical 
jobs, the authors hypothesized that the higher incidence of manual work 
limited survivors’ ability to remain employed because of the effects of 
cancer and its treatment.
90
 Additionally, rural survivors have less access 
to psychosocial resources, leading to higher rates of emotional distress 
that may also encourage retirement.
91
 Finally, both manual jobs and rural 
homes are associated with reduced availability of disability benefits, 
which may explain the lower number of rural survivors receiving such 
benefits.
92
 
3. Type of Work 
Individuals with more physical jobs are less likely to remain 
employed both during and after treatment. Significant percentages of 
breast and prostate cancer survivors who had jobs requiring physical 
                                                     
86. Id. 
87. See, e.g., Bradley & Bednarek, supra note 59, at 193 (finding only slightly higher retirement 
rate among cancer survivors compared to general population); de Boer et al., supra note 56, at 760 
(showing no clear association between age and unemployment for cancer survivors); Hassett et al., 
supra note 76, at 2778 (finding older women with cancer more likely to experience a change in 
employment than younger women); Mehnert, supra note 46, at 123 (noting that some studies in 
meta-analysis showed younger age associated with likelihood of return to work); Spelten et al., 
supra note 59, at 129 (finding in meta-analysis of fourteen studies that most showed no relationship 
between age and return to work, but one showed increasing age negatively associated with work); 
Markowski, supra note 13, at 118 (finding cancer-free survivors are not likely to retire sooner than 
individuals with no history of cancer while cancer survivors with recurrence retire sooner). 
88. See, e.g., Short et al., supra note 36, at 1296–97 (showing higher disability rates for women 
than for men); Mehnert, supra note 46, at 123 (showing some studies in meta-analysis found 
females less likely to return to work); Moran et al., supra note 72, at 511 (showing similar 
employment effects for both genders except that men had a larger reduction in hours and also had 
greater employment reductions than women if they had recurrence, metastasis, or new cancers); 
Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 129 (finding in meta-analysis of fourteen studies no relationship 
between gender and return to work); Markowski, supra note 13, at 41, 131 (finding female cancer 
survivors with greater levels of education were more likely to work while the same was not true for 
men and that stage of cancer affects continuation of employment for men but not women). 
89. Michelle Sowden et al., The Impact of Cancer Diagnosis on Employment: Is There a 
Difference Between Rural and Urban Populations?, 8 J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 213, 216 (2014). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
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work reported physical disabilities
93
 at twelve and eighteen months 
following diagnosis.
94
 Those with disabilities were more likely to leave 
the workforce.
95
 Cancer survivors from low-income families are also 
less likely to work following cancer diagnosis,
96
 although those who 
continued to work were not more likely to reduce their hours or change 
jobs.
97
 Lower income survivors were more likely to report a broad range 
of negative work experiences in the two years following diagnosis, 
including discharge, layoff, denial of a raise or promotion, demotion, or 
transfer.
98
 The tendency of low-income survivors to leave work almost 
certainly has some relationship to type of work, but may have some 
independent force as well.
99
 Quality of life may have less association 
with work for lower income individuals.
100
 It is also possible that lower 
income survivors may be eligible for government benefits that replace 
more of pre-cancer income and provide some health benefits so that the 
urgency to return to work is less. Indeed, these low-income jobs may not 
provide health insurance benefits so that unemployment is not associated 
with loss of health insurance coverage. 
4. Source of Health Insurance 
Because employment provides health insurance for many individuals 
in the United States, the source of health insurance has been examined as 
a factor in determining employment outcomes for individuals with 
cancer. Further, the absence of insurance has been demonstrated to cause 
                                                     
93. The study used the definition of disability from the International Classification of 
Functioning, Disability and Health: “[L]imitations in physical or mental functions, caused by one or 
more medical conditions, in carrying out socially defined tasks or roles.” Oberst et al., supra note 
38, at 323. 
94. Id. at 326–27. 
95. Id. At twelve months post-diagnosis, sixty percent of women and twenty-nine percent of men 
reported physical disability resulting from cancer, while at eighteen months post-diagnosis, the 
disability rates had declined to thirty-six percent for women and seventeen percent for men. Id. at 
326. Reports of cognitive disability among those with jobs requiring cognitive tasks were less 
prevalent, but still present. Id.  
96. Bouknight et al., supra note 70, at 347; Mehnert, supra note 46, at 123 (finding a number of 
studies showing both lower income and manual labor associated with reduced likelihood of 
employment); Blinder et al., supra note 81, at 1671 (finding that low income survivors of various 
ethnicities did not have the same rates of return to work as higher income white survivors); Steiner, 
supra note 77, at 145. 
97. Steiner, supra note 77, at 145. 
98. Miao Yu et al., Employment Experience of Cancer Survivors 2 Years Post-Diagnosis in the 
Study of Cancer Survivors-I, 6 J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 210, 212–13, 217 (2012).  
99. See Blinder et al., supra note 81, at 1669. 
100. Id. at 1672. 
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poor health outcomes for cancer patients.
101
 Thus maintenance of 
insurance is important to reduce treatment costs and save lives.
102
 
Evidence demonstrates that cancer survivors with employer-provided 
health insurance are more likely to remain employed
103
 and to work 
more hours than those with health insurance through another source, 
such as a working spouse.
104
 When married women with employer-based 
health insurance were compared with similarly situated women with 
insurance from another source, a study found that at least some survivors 
were working and working more hours than they would without the need 
to maintain health insurance coverage.
105
 While maintaining 
employment may appear to be a beneficial outcome, these workers may 
have adverse health outcomes as a result of continuing to work, as 
compliance with the best treatment options may be difficult or 
impossible to reconcile with the need for continued employment.
106
 
Additionally, some employees may be constrained in their career 
development because of a concern that changing jobs might affect their 
ability to obtain affordable health insurance coverage that would cover 
future cancer treatment if needed, and residual effects of past 
treatment.
107
 
Employer-based health insurance not only spurs continued 
employment and increased hours of work, but it also limits job changes 
for cancer survivors.
108
 While cancer survivors who did not have health 
insurance from their employer changed jobs more often than other 
                                                     
101. Cathy J. Bradley et al., Acute Myeloid Leukemia: How the Uninsured Fare, 117 CANCER 
4772, 4772, 4776 (2011); Cathy J. Bradley et al., Differences in Breast Cancer Diagnosis and 
Treatment: Experiences of Insured and Uninsured Women in a Safety-Net Setting, 45 INQUIRY 323, 
328 (2008) [hereinafter Breast Cancer Diagnosis]. 
102. Breast Cancer Diagnosis, supra note 101, at 328. 
103. See Cathy J. Bradley et al., Employment-Contingent Health Insurance, Illness, and Labor 
Supply of Women: Evidence from Married Women with Breast Cancer, 16 HEALTH ECON. 719, 732 
(2006) [hereinafter Employment-Contingent Health Insurance]; Employer-Provided Health 
Insurance, supra note 64, at 841, 848; Employment and Cancer, supra note 60, at 51; Kaan Tunceli 
et al., Cancer Survivorship, Health Insurance, and Employment Transitions Among Older Workers, 
46 INQUIRY 17, 29 (2009). These studies preceded the implementation of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, which has expanded the availability of health insurance and limited the 
exclusion of preexisting conditions. It is too early to assess the impact of that law, but it should limit 
the constraining effects of health insurance for at least some cancer survivors.  
104. Employment-Contingent Health Insurance, supra note 103, at 732; Steiner, supra note 77, at 
141–42; Tunceli et al., supra note 103, at 26. 
105. Employment-Contingent Health Insurance, supra note 103, at 732.  
106. Id.  
107. Steiner, supra note 77, at 142–43. 
108. Id. at 143; Tunceli et al., supra note 103, at 29. 
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employees, those whose health insurance was tied to their employment 
changed jobs less frequently.
109
 As one group of scholars noted: 
Not only are survivors handicapped in advancing their careers or 
pursuing leisure interests by their need for health insurance, but 
those who have continuing health problems as a result of cancer 
and treatment may be less able to accommodate changes in their 
health or functional status by changing jobs or cutting back on 
work. In these ways, survivors pay a higher “price” for health 
insurance that affects their quality of life and adds to the 
economic burden of cancer.
 110
 
5. Employer Support and Accommodation 
Studies reflect the importance of workplace support and 
accommodation for survivors’ successful return to work. Perceived 
support and accommodation are positively associated with working for 
survivors and perceived discrimination is negatively associated with 
continuing to work.
111
 Reports of discrimination were not widespread in 
those studies that asked survivors about discriminatory treatment, 
however.
112
 Not only was support from employers and a flexible work 
                                                     
109. Tunceli et al., supra note 103, at 29. 
110. Id. 
111. Blinder et al., supra note 34, at 768–69; Bouknight et al., supra note 70, at 345; Bradley & 
Bednarek, supra note 59, at 189; M.L. Lindbohm et al., Cancer as the Cause of Changes in Work 
Situation (A NOCWO Study), 20 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 805, 810–11 (2010); Mehnert, supra note 46, 
at 122–23 (meta-analysis of sixty-four studies showing perceived employer accommodation 
increased likelihood of return to work while perceived discrimination decreased it, and the 
availability of flexible work arrangements increased the probability of working during treatment); 
Moskowitz et al., supra note 62, at 177 (finding discrimination, poor treatment, and denial of 
accommodations by employer significantly related to both ability to work and maintenance of 
employment); Mujahid et al., supra note 75, at 108; Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 128–29 
(conducting a meta-analysis of fourteen studies from different countries and finding that support and 
accommodation of flexible work hours and workloads was positively associated with return to work 
but citing one study from Canada finding employer discrimination was not “significantly related to 
return to work” and “did not seem to be a more prevalent problem among cancer survivors than in a 
control group”); Tiedtke et al., supra note 34, at 677, 680, 682 (conducting a meta-analysis of six 
studies from three different countries). The Canadian study found that eighteen percent of cured 
cancer survivors reported discrimination, twenty-one percent of cancer survivors with a poor 
prognosis reported discrimination, and fifteen percent of the control group reported discrimination. 
Deborah Ehrmann-Feldmann et al., Perceived Discrimination Against Cured Cancer Patients in the 
Workforce, 136 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 719, 722 (1987).  
112. Employment and Cancer, supra note 60, at 52; Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 128 (meta-
analysis of fourteen studies from different countries); Yu et al., supra note 98, at 215 (finding only 
9.3% of cancer survivors reported discrimination at work but the study separately reported negative 
working experiences such as layoff and termination that might also have been the result of 
discrimination. Also the study reported lack of support from the employer as a significant problem 
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environment significant in association with work continuation after a 
cancer diagnosis, but support of coworkers was also important.
113
 
Among the accommodations that made survivors more likely to remain 
employed were a return-to-work meeting with the employer, flexible 
work schedules, paid sick leave, assistance with certain work tasks, and 
control over the type or amount of work.
114
 The importance of 
accommodation cut across demographic lines and applied regardless of 
type of work or type of cancer.
115
 
C. Summary 
The good news is that many cancer patients are able to work, some 
with little or no disruption in employment. Others, however, have work 
disruptions of various lengths, depending on the type of cancer, the 
treatment and the job, and even after return to work need 
accommodation. Some cancer survivors are unable to continue working 
because of their cancer. Low income workers and workers with physical 
jobs are less likely to be employed after a cancer diagnosis, and some 
studies also find race and ethnicity associated with lower employment 
levels. Insurance also has a constraining effect—cancer survivors who 
have employer-based health insurance are more likely to remain 
employed. In some cases, working may exacerbate symptoms and 
psychological stress, while in others it may have positive benefits for the 
survivor. 
                                                     
which could encompass failure to accommodate, which under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
constitutes discrimination). A Korean study, however, found discrimination against cancer patients 
to be a more significant problem. Jae-Hyun Park et al., Changes in Employment Status and 
Experience of Discrimination Among Cancer Patients: Findings from a Nationwide Survey in 
Korea, 19 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 1303, 1306 (2010). 
113. Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 128. 
114. Blinder et al., supra note 34, at 5–6 (finding flexibility in work schedule and job tasks, 
medical leave and assistance with physical job tasks to be important accommodations); Anja 
Mehnert et al., Employment Challenges for Cancer Survivors, 10 CANCER 2151, 2153 (2013) (citing 
studies showing the importance of, inter alia, a return-to-work meeting, flexible working conditions, 
training, and counseling); Mujahid et al., supra note 75, at 108 (finding paid sick leave and a 
flexible work schedule to be important accommodations); Pryce et al., supra note 40, at 87–90 
(showing the importance of flexible work schedules, paid time off, sick leave in excess of the legal 
minimum, and changes in the physical environment in remaining employed); Tiedtke et al., supra 
note 34, at 681 (finding flexibility in schedule and work, assistance with work tasks, changes in 
work tasks, and gradual assimilation back into the workplace to be valued accommodations). 
115. See Employment and Cancer, supra note 60, at 51–52; Short et al., supra note 36, at 1299–
1300 (emphasizing the importance of accommodation and support over the long-term); Mujahid et 
al., supra note 75, at 108; Spelten et al., supra note 59, at 129; Park et al., supra note 112, at 1306–
07. 
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Having reviewed the research on cancer and employment, I turn now 
to the question of what implications this data has for the law. Some of 
the factors that affect employment, such as the type of cancer and race 
and ethnicity, are outside anyone’s control. Law, medicine, and 
employers can impact the other factors, however, such as type of 
treatment, type of work, employer support and accommodation, and 
source of insurance. These controllable factors can have some mitigating 
impact on the effects of race and ethnicity. As noted in the medical 
research, many of the medical, legal, and social interventions designed 
to increase employment have focused on the individual with cancer.
116
 
The law, however, has the ability to spur structural and policy changes 
that may increase employment of cancer survivors. 
III. THE LAWS 
In the United States, there is a patchwork of laws that provide some 
protection for cancer survivors (and others) in achieving the goals 
discussed above. Among the relevant laws are the following: the Family 
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which provides for employment leave 
for serious medical conditions; the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”), which prohibits employment discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities and requires employers to offer them 
reasonable accommodations to enable employment; the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (“COBRA”),117 which 
provides for continuation of health insurance following termination of 
employment; the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”),118 which bars preexisting condition limitations in health 
insurance under certain conditions; the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (“ERISA”),119 which governs employee benefit plans; the 
Social Security Act,
120
 which provides income and Medicare
121
 or 
Medicaid
122
 health insurance coverage for disabled individuals; and the 
                                                     
116. Moscowitz et al., supra note 62, at 174.  
117. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82. 
118. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).  
119. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 31 
U.S.C.). 
120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434 (2012). 
121. Id. §§ 1395–1395ccc. 
122. Id. §§ 301–1397mm. 
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recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
123
 which is 
designed to assist individuals with preexisting conditions in obtaining 
health insurance and encourage employers to provide, and individuals to 
obtain, health insurance. In addition to these federal laws, many states 
have laws that offer additional benefits and protections for cancer 
survivors.
124
 
This Article initiates what is contemplated to be a long-term, multi-
stage assessment of these laws against the research on cancer and 
employment, accompanied by recommendations for change. Of course, 
to some extent all of the legal protections are interrelated and changes in 
one may affect or vitiate the need for changes in another. But as is 
typical in American employment law, our country has taken a piecemeal 
approach to addressing the issues with a variety of legal mechanisms. 
The project begins with an analysis of the laws that require leave and 
other accommodations and prohibit discrimination based on disability. 
The federal FMLA and the ADA are closely related pieces of legislation 
that work together to protect workers with medical problems and 
preserve their employment.
125
 The FMLA requires employers of a 
certain size to provide leave to employees with serious medical 
conditions,
126
 while the ADA prevents discrimination and requires 
accommodation of disabilities.
127
 Since leave may be an 
accommodation, these laws are interrelated. Thus this Article assesses 
                                                     
123. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029. 
124. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting 
discrimination in employment/housing because of “medical condition”); id. § 12926 (defining 
“medical condition” as “[a]ny health impairment related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer 
or a record or history of cancer” and extending protection to persons with “genetic characteristics” 
which “cause” cancer, including the children of those with cancer); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 
(West, Westlaw through 2013) (prohibiting housing and employment discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities); Soules v. Mount Holiness Mem’l Park, 808 A.2d 863, 867 (N.J. 
Super. 2002) (finding individual with cancer had a disability “regardless of the length of the 
recuperative period or the temporal consequences of his cancer” and citing earlier case finding 
individual with cancer who had mastectomy had disability because any illness that causes 
amputation is a disability); infra notes 325–26, 410–11 and accompanying text. 
125. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (2012), which bars disability 
discrimination by the federal government, federal contractors, and federal fund recipients will also 
be considered to the extent that it applies. Congress provided that the ADA standards for 
employment discrimination apply to discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. 
§ 794(d). A significant difference between the two statutes, however, is that the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 specifically requires affirmative action on the part of federal agencies and government 
contractors. Id. §§ 791, 793. 
126. See Family Medical Leave Act, id. §§ 2601–2654. 
127. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
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each of these laws and discusses similar state laws that provide greater 
protection and/or benefits to cancer patients. 
A. Normative Goals 
Before assessing what approach the law should take with regard to 
employment and cancer, it is important to determine the goals that the 
law should be designed to achieve. Broadly, it seems beyond debate
128
 
that cancer survivors should have the basic human rights of sufficient 
income and resources for a minimum standard of living
129
 along with 
access to necessary medical treatment.
130
 Additionally, the psychological 
benefits of working
131
 suggest that those cancer patients who can work 
(and, importantly, those that also want to work) should have the 
opportunity to do so—even when they would have sufficient resources 
without work. The employment goal provides a societal benefit as well 
since individuals who are working at living wage jobs pay state, federal, 
and Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes and, in most cases, do not 
draw significantly on public benefits.
132
 For those for whom working 
interferes with treatment, enabling them to support themselves and 
obtain treatment without working should be the goal. 
The question of how to achieve the goals, including what role the law 
should play, leaves more room for debate. For those survivors able and 
desiring to work, the ability to obtain or maintain a job without 
discrimination is likely to meet these goals if the job provides affordable 
                                                     
128. While some might disagree on how to achieve these goals and what sort of cost/benefit 
analysis to apply to efforts to achieve them, the goals themselves seem incontrovertible. The United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides the following: “Everyone has the right to 
work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection 
against unemployment,” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), Art. 23(1) (Dec. 10, 
1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtm; “Everyone who works has 
the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy 
of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary by other means of social protection,” id. at Art. 
23(3); and everyone has “the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, . . . or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control,” id. at Art. 25(1). See 
also BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 30, at 91, 112 (arguing for living wage jobs that provide 
“physical, economic, social and health security” as a matter of equity and noting that employment 
law in the United States is strong on efficiency and weak on equity). For those who disagree with 
the goals, there really is nothing to debate.  
129. This would include adequate shelter, food, and clothing. 
130. Such medical treatment includes any medication necessary. 
131. See supra notes 34, 44, 112–13 and accompanying text. 
132. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Relieving (Most of) the Tension: A Review Essay of Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, Law and the Contradictions of the Disability Rights Movement, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 761, 802–03 (2011). 
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health insurance coverage, adequate work hours and pay, and the 
flexibility to continue necessary medical treatment.
133
 For those unable 
to work at a job that will provide these benefits who have no other 
resources to meet these goals, some form of income support and 
affordable health insurance or treatment coverage will be necessary. 
These goals are important not only for the individuals involved but also 
for society as a whole. The economy suffers as a result of reduced 
productivity, locking employees into jobs that do not take advantage of 
their skills and abilities because of their cancer, costly health problems 
resulting from inability to obtain proper treatment in a timely fashion, 
bankruptcies, and poverty. But in determining how to achieve these 
goals, we must consider where the costs fall. If the goals are achieved 
through employment laws such as the ADA and FMLA, they will fall on 
employers. Thus, in determining how to approach the problem, we must 
consider not only issues of equity for cancer survivors but also 
efficiency for business and society.
134
 In considering efficiency, we must 
be aware of the fact that American business must compete in a 
globalized economy. 
B. Family Medical Leave Act 
Because the availability of leave, and particularly paid leave, is an 
important determinant of continued employment, the FMLA will be 
analyzed first. This federal statute, which covers employers with fifty or 
more employees,
135
 entitles eligible employees with serious health 
conditions to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave in a 
twelve-month period.
136
 To be eligible, an employee must have worked 
for the employer for one year and worked at least 1250 hours in the past 
year.
137
 Health insurance must be continued during the leave as if the 
                                                     
133. Of course, not all jobs currently available in the United States meet these requirements. 
BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 30, at 91. Cancer survivors should be no more likely to end up in such 
jobs than other employees, however, and should not end up in those jobs because they have cancer. 
Further, since the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, insurance is available to many, 
though not all, through means other than employment. 
134. I rely here on the framework adopted by Befort and Budd for evaluating employment laws. 
They should balance the goals of equity, efficiency, and voice for workers. BEFORT & BUDD, supra 
note 30, at 129–30. 
135. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (2012). While state employers are covered by the FMLA, 
employees cannot collect damages from state employers who violate the FMLA’s provisions 
dealing with the employee’s own serious health condition. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., __ 
U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1335 (2012).  
136. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). 
137. See id. § 2611(2)(A). 
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employee was working.
138
 The law allows employees to take the leave 
intermittently if needed,
139
 though the employee must make a reasonable 
effort to schedule treatment so as not to unduly disrupt the employer’s 
operations.
140
 The employer has the option to alter work duties to avoid 
disruption caused by intermittent leave for planned treatment.
141
 
Employees may opt to take any paid leave available as part of the FMLA 
leave and the employer may require the use of paid leave as well.
142
 An 
additional benefit of the FMLA is the caregiver provision, which allows 
employees time off to care for family members with serious health 
conditions.
143
 Finally, the FMLA prohibits retaliation against individuals 
who take advantage of its provisions.
144
 
The FMLA has the potential to assist with the needs of cancer 
survivors by providing job-protected leave for treatment and recovery 
since cancer will almost always constitute a serious health condition.
145
 
The provisions for intermittent leave can be particularly helpful by 
allowing patients to take periodic time off for treatments like radiation 
and chemotherapy. Employees can take the necessary leave without 
fearing loss of either their job or their essential health insurance. While 
employers initially feared that FMLA leave would impose significant 
burdens, it appears that most employers do not replace employees on 
leave and the overwhelming majority of employees on leave return to 
work for the employer, so no costly permanent replacement is 
necessary.
146
 Further, a relatively small percentage of workers take 
                                                     
138. See id. § 2614(c)(1). 
139. See id. § 2612(b)(1). 
140. See id. § 2612(e)(2)(A). 
141. See id. § 2612(b)(2). 
142. See id. § 2612(d)(2)(A). 
143. See id. § 2612(a)(1)(C). The FMLA also provides leave for birth or adoption of a child. Id. 
§ 2612(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
144. Id. § 2615(b); Drew v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00907, 2012 WL 2341690 (S.D. 
Ohio June 20, 2012) (denying summary judgment to employer because jury could find FMLA 
retaliation where plaintiff was laid off during reduction in force while on FMLA leave for surgery, 
during which time her fiancé was diagnosed with cancer, and others with similar disciplinary 
records were not laid off); Scott v. Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:11-CV-02094-G, 2012 
WL 136162 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim that he was 
denied a transfer in retaliation for taking FMLA leave to care for his wife with cancer). 
145. Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2006). “Serious health condition is 
defined” by the C.F.R. as “an illness, injury, impairment or physical or mental condition that 
involves inpatient care as defined in § 825.114 or continuing treatment by a health care provider as 
defined in § 825.115.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.102 (2014).  
146. Gayle Cinquegrani, FMLA Leave Not Overly Disruptive or Costly and Should Be Expanded, 
Panelists Contend, 26 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-7 (Feb. 27, 2013); ABT ASSOCS., FAMILY 
MEDICAL LEAVE IN 2012: TECHNICAL REPORT 109, 145–46 (2013), available at 
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intermittent leave and FMLA leave does not impose a substantial burden 
on most employers.
147
 
But there are significant limitations in the FMLA’s benefits for cancer 
survivors. Because of the limitations on employer and employee 
coverage, many employees cannot take advantage of the leave provided. 
Our hypothetical survivor Sarah, for example, has not been employed for 
a year and thus has no FMLA entitlement, although her employer is of 
sufficient size to be covered. A recent study found that approximately 
forty-one percent of workers are ineligible for FMLA coverage, leaving 
large numbers of workers outside the scope of the statute.
148
 More than a 
third of worksites surveyed that were not covered by the law had 
employees who took leave for reasons that would qualify for FMLA 
protection.
149
 
Further, FMLA leave is unpaid, and while paid leave can be 
substituted if available, many employees taking leave receive no pay.
150
 
And because of employer limits on paid leave, the more time an 
employee takes, the less likely that it will be fully paid.
151
 Notably, 
however, employees eligible for FMLA leave were more likely to 
receive pay for leave based on the employer’s policies.152 Additionally, 
employees in higher income brackets are substantially more likely to 
have fully paid leave, while employees in lower income brackets are 
                                                     
http://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/fmla/FMLA-2012-Technical-Report.pdf. Most of the data in this 
section comes from the most recent study funded by the U.S. Department of Labor, which 
administers the law. Id. at i. That study is not limited to individuals with cancer. Id. 
147. ABT ASSOCS., supra note 146, at 162. 
148. Id. at i, 21–22. While some states have similar leave statutes, most do not cover smaller 
employers and most do not provide longer leave periods. See State Family and Medical Leave Laws, 
NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-
employment/state-family-and-medical-leave-laws.aspx. 
149. ABT ASSOCS., supra note 146, at 84. This includes leave for childbirth and parenting as well 
as leave for the employee’s own serious health condition or that of an immediate family member. 
While these employees may have been provided leave, the absence of FMLA protections means that 
the employees were not guaranteed a return to their job or insurance continuation. 
150. Id. at ii, 97. About a third of employees received no pay. Id. at 97. Forty-eight percent 
received full pay and another seventeen percent partial pay. Id. at 98. Another study, based on data 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, found that only 57.1% of employees have access to any paid 
sick days on their job. Sarah Jane Glynn & Jane Farrell, Latinos Least Likely to Have Paid Leave or 
Workplace Flexibility, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 2 (Nov. 20, 2012), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/GlynnLatinosPaidLeave1.pdf. 
151. ABT ASSOC., supra note 146, at ii, 97. Only forty-one percent of employees with leaves of 
more than ten days, which probably includes almost all individuals with cancer, received full pay. 
Id. at 97. 
152. Id. at 102–03. 
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much more likely to have no paid leave.
153
 Paid leave also varies by race 
and ethnicity, with Latinos least likely to have paid sick leave, followed 
by African-Americans.
154
 This may help explain why Latinas with 
cancer suffer more unemployment than non-Latina workers.
155
 Almost 
two-thirds of surveyed employees reported difficulty making ends meet 
as a result of taking leave with partial or no pay.
156
 While our 
hypothetical survivor, Sarah, has paid leave, it is voluntarily provided by 
her employer, and is unlikely to be sufficient for her needs.
157
 Given that 
cancer survivors in the extensive studies analyzed above indicated that 
paid leave was an important accommodation in retaining employment, 
these findings regarding the limits of paid leave are significant. 
Another limitation of the FMLA that may affect cancer survivors is 
the length of the leave. Only twelve weeks are available in each twelve-
month period. If an employee needs more leave, FMLA does not protect 
the employee’s job.158As demonstrated by the research on cancer and 
employment, treatment for some cancers may affect the employee’s 
health in ways that limit the ability to work for more than twelve weeks, 
regardless of whether the leave is taken intermittently or in succession. 
Even if Sarah was covered by the FMLA, her need for leave might 
exceed the twelve weeks, especially if her employer’s opposition to her 
shift changing accommodation persists. 
C. Americans with Disabilities Act 
The Americans with Disabilities Act has broader protections than the 
FMLA and therefore greater potential to preserve employment for 
cancer survivors. After a brief introduction to the statute, this Article 
will analyze the ADA’s application to the identified needs of cancer 
survivors. The employment provisions of the ADA took effect in 
                                                     
153. Id. at 99; Glynn & Farrell, supra note 150, at 4.  
154. Glynn & Farrell, supra note 150, at 2. Latinos are significantly below the other ethnic groups 
in leave availability, with only 38.4% having paid sick leave, compared to 57.4% of African-
Americans, the next lowest group. Id. Latinos are also far less likely to have other leave that might 
be taken in lieu of sick leave, such as paid vacation. Id. 
155. See supra notes 81, 84–85 and accompanying text. 
156. ABT ASSOC., supra note 146, at 106. 
157. Voluntarily provided leave may not be an enforceable benefit if it is not provided in an 
employment contract. Even if it is, lung cancer is a debilitating cancer that will likely require more 
than the two weeks of leave that Sarah has available. See supra note 61.  
158. The study, depending on the method of counting for leaves that were in progress at the time 
of the interview, indicated that either fourteen percent or seventeen percent of leaves were sixty or 
more days in length. ABT ASSOC., supra note 146, at 68. 
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1992.
159
 The law covers employees of employers with fifteen or more 
employees,
160
 and prohibits discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities, individuals with a record of disabilities, and individuals who 
are perceived to have a disability.
161
 Further, to be protected from 
discrimination in employment, the individual must be a “qualified 
individual” which is defined as someone who can perform the “essential 
functions” of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.162 The 
definition of disability was substantially amended in 2008, effective 
2009, to broaden the coverage of the Act, which had been restricted by 
judicial interpretation.
163
 Cancer survivors who meet the definition of 
disability and are denied initial employment or terminated or 
discriminated against on the job because of their cancer have a remedy 
under the statute.
164
 
As discussed in Section III.B.5, employer accommodation of cancer 
survivors is an important determinant of employment. In addition to 
prohibiting discrimination, the ADA requires covered employers to 
accommodate individuals with disabilities to enable them to do the job, 
so long as the accommodation is reasonable, allows the employee to 
perform the essential functions of the job, and does not impose undue 
hardship on the employer.
165
 This implicates the flexibility in work that 
many survivors indicate is crucial to maintaining employment. 
The following sections will first review how the definition of 
disability has been applied to cancer survivors both before and after the 
2008 amendments. Then the anti-discrimination and accommodation 
provisions most relevant to the needs of cancer survivors will be 
analyzed for their effectiveness. 
1. A Historical Perspective 
In 2000, Barbara Hoffman, General Counsel of the National Coalition 
                                                     
159. President Bush signed the ADA, Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), on July 26, 
1990. Title I became effective July 26, 1992 for employers with twenty-five or more employees and 
two years later for employers with fifteen or more employees. S. REP. NO. 101-116, 2 (1989). 
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2012). Thus, the law does not protect employees of small 
employers and independent contractors. 
161. See id. § 12102 (defining disability); id. § 12112 (prohibiting discrimination). 
162. See id. § 12112 (barring discrimination); id. § 12111(8) (defining “qualified individual” with 
disability). 
163. See infra notes 175–81 and accompanying text. 
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (barring discrimination in hiring, promotion, discharge, and other 
terms and conditions of employment). 
165. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
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for Cancer Survivorship, comprehensively evaluated the effectiveness of 
the ADA as applied to cancer survivors.
166
 She analyzed a series of cases 
decided under the statute, finding that plaintiffs either prevailed or 
survived summary judgment in fewer than half.
167
 The problem she 
identified, the Catch-22, was that courts found that plaintiffs who could 
work had no disability, but those who were limited in their ability to 
work were not “qualified individuals with disabilities”168 and therefore 
not protected by the Act.
169
 Capturing the problem by describing the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc.,170 Hoffman 
noted: 
Under the Fifth Circuit’s logic, had Ellison chosen to take 
several months of medical leave during the first stage of her 
treatment, and then returned to work half-time for the next 
several weeks, she would have demonstrated a “substantial 
limiting impairment” of her ability to work. Thus, under the 
Fifth Circuit’s analysis, those employees who work the hardest 
to maintain their jobs are precisely the ones denied protection 
under the ADA. Bringing this irony full circle, the Fifth Circuit 
would doubtlessly have concluded that had Phyllis Ellison taken 
an extended medical leave from work, she would not have been 
“otherwise qualified” for her job, and therefore it would have 
caught her with the other prong of the Catch-22.
171
 
In the cases in which plaintiffs prevailed, the courts were more 
                                                     
166. Barbara Hoffman, Between a Disability and a Hard Place: The Cancer Survivors’ Catch-22 
of Proving Disability Status Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 MD. L. REV. 352 (2000). 
167. Id. at 407–08. 
168. “Qualified individual with a disability” is a statutory term, defined as one who can do the 
essential functions of the job, with or without accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). 
169. Hoffman, supra note 166, at 353. This Catch-22 is not, of course, limited to cancer survivors 
and was one of the motivating factors for amendment. See Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again: 
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the “Regarded As” Prong of the 
Statutory Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993, 1001–19 (detailing the concerns that led 
to the amendments and the Congressional response). For additional criticism of judicial 
interpretation of the ADA, see, for example, Cheryl L. Anderson, What Is “Because of the 
Disability” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, 
and the Windfall Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323 (2006); Ruth Colker, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999); 
Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 19 (2000); Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination 
Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 91, 
91–92 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the 
ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321 (2000). 
170. 85 F.3d 187 (1996). 
171. Hoffman, supra note 166, at 380 (citations omitted).  
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willing to look at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) regulations and the legislative history of the ADA. These 
authorities indicate an intent both to include cancer as a disability under 
the statute and to find that hospitalization, which most cancer survivors 
undergo at some point, establishes a record of impairment sufficient to 
meet the definition for statutory coverage.
172
 Additionally, Hoffman 
found that plaintiffs who alleged disability under all three prongs of the 
definition were more likely to succeed.
173
 Finally, the type of cancer 
seemed to have an impact on the determination of whether it met the 
definition of disability.
174
 
While Hoffman identified significant difficulties for cancer survivors 
bringing ADA cases, she offered a blueprint on how to overcome the 
hurdles created by the courts.
175
 Despite her good advice and somewhat 
optimistic conclusion that cancer survivors in some cases might 
overcome the challenges, she conducted a subsequent analysis that 
confirmed that plaintiffs continued to face dismal prospects under the 
ADA between 2000 and 2008.
176
 In 2008, Congress amended the statute, 
responding to the judicial narrowing of the definition of disability and 
                                                     
172. Id. at 409–11. 
173. Id. at 408–09. 
174. Id. at 411–12. 
175. Id. at 432–38. 
176. See Barbara Hoffman, The Law of Intended Consequences: Did the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act Make It Easier for Cancer Survivor to Prove Disability Status?, 68 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 843, 858–67 (2013). For case examples, see Turner v. Sullivan 
University Systems, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 773 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (finding patient with breast cancer 
was not limited in major life activities despite her inability to perform any activities that required 
lifting, including portions of her job, and thus was not disabled under the ADA); Treiber v. 
Lindbergh Sch. Dist., 199 F. Supp. 2d 949 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (finding that music teacher with breast 
cancer, who underwent a lumpectomy, chemotherapy, and suffered limited movement in her left 
arm, was not disabled under the ADA because the impairment had not sufficiently interfered with 
major life activities); and Pimental v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, 236 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.N.H. 
2002) (finding the plaintiff with breast cancer requiring an eight month leave of absence for 
treatment consisting of chemotherapy, mastectomy, and radiation was not disabled because her 
impairment was too short term to be considered substantially limiting of major life activities and 
therefore, a statutory disability). For a study that shows the dismal success rate for all ADA 
plaintiffs, see Amy Albright, 2004 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 
29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 513, 515 (2005) (showing employers won the 
following percentages of ADA employment cases between 2000 and 2004: 2000—96.4%; 2001—
95.7%; 2002—94.5%; 2003—98%; 2004—97%). Interestingly, a pre-amendment study of EEOC 
claims filed by cancer survivors found that the EEOC was more likely to find reasonable cause in 
cancer cases compared to other disabilities. See Michael Feuerstein et al., Pattern of Workplace 
Disputes in Cancer Survivors: A Population Study of ADA Claims, 1 J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 185, 
191–92 (2007). Administrative success before the EEOC, however, does not necessarily translate to 
success in court. A few plaintiffs did manage to establish cancer as a disability under the statute 
despite the difficulties, however. Hoffman, supra note 166, at 409–12.  
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consequent difficulties for plaintiffs bringing ADA claims.
177
 
2. The ADA Amendments Act: Restoring the Act’s Coverage 
Congress sought to redress the exact problem Hoffman identified: 
The difficulty plaintiffs faced establishing a current disability or a record 
of disability, or, alternatively, that their employer regarded them as 
having a disability.
178
 As a result of this difficulty, most plaintiffs failed 
to meet the first requirement necessary for coverage under the statute, 
never reaching the question of whether they were discriminated against 
or unlawfully denied accommodation. While the definition of disability 
was not substantially changed, Congress expressly rejected the Supreme 
Court cases that had narrowed the definition of disability and specified 
that the definition of disability should be broadly construed.
179
 Further, 
Congress clarified the interpretation of the terms “substantially limits,” 
“major life activities,” and “regarded as” in the definition of disability.180 
In defining major life activities, Congress included “the operation of a 
major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the 
immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, 
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive 
functions.”181 
Congress directed the EEOC to issue regulations implementing the 
statutory changes, which it did, effective May 24, 2011.
182
 In addition to 
the general broadening of the definition of disability, several provisions 
in the regulations will help cancer survivors meet the definition. Among 
the EEOC’s rules of construction of disability derived explicitly from the 
statute is the following: “An impairment that is episodic or in remission 
is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when 
active.”183 In support of this regulation the EEOC cited the legislative 
                                                     
177. See Befort, supra note 169, at 1001–19. 
178. See id.; Hoffman, supra note 176, at 846–48.  
179. Befort, supra note 169, at 1013; Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 217 (2008); see ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–235, §§ 2(b)(1)–(5), 
3(4)(A), 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012)) (“The definition of disability 
in this chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the 
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.”). 
180. Befort, supra note 169, at 1014–18. 
181. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). 
182. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16978 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1630). 
183. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (2014); 29 U.S.C. §12102(4)(D) (2012). 
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history’s rejection of cases finding cancer in remission to be too “short-
lived” to meet the test of substantial limitation.184 Further, Section 
1630.2(j)(3) cites certain impairments whose coverage will be 
“predictable, consistent, and workable,” leading to a conclusion “in 
virtually all cases” that there is either an actual disability or a history of a 
disability.
185
 Among the conditions cited is cancer, as it “should easily 
be concluded that . . . cancer substantially limits normal cell growth,” 
which is, according to the amendments, a major life activity.
186
 The 
explanatory comments quote Representative Steny Hoyer, one of the 
original sponsors of the ADA, stating “we could not have fathomed that 
people with diabetes, . . . cancer, . . . and other disabilities would have 
their ADA claims denied because they would be considered too 
functional to meet the definition of disability.”187 
Both the statute and the regulations seem designed to ensure that, 
among others, cancer survivors will be covered by the ADA. Although it 
is far too early for a complete assessment,
188
 the cases decided post-
amendment have largely found cancer survivors covered by the 
statute.
189
 Plaintiffs have survived defense motions for summary 
                                                     
184. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. at 17011 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2 (2008)). 
185. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). 
186. Id. 
187. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 17012 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2 at 10 
(2008)). 
188. Because the statute has not been found to apply retroactively, relatively few ADAAA cases 
have reached the decisional level. See Boitnott v. Corning, Inc., 669 F.3d 172, 177 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(holding employee with leukemia not disabled under pre-amendment ADA and no retroactive 
application); Fredricksen v. United Parcel Serv., 581 F.3d 516, 521–23 & n.1 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the amendments did not apply retroactively and that the plaintiff with leukemia could 
not show substantial impairment of a major life activity or that he was regarded as having such an 
impairment). 
189. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, A PROMISING START: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF 
COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT (2013), available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2013/07232013 (finding plaintiffs under the ADAAA have been 
largely successful in getting courts to accept the EEOC’s determination that cancer is virtually 
always a disability); Hoffman, supra note 176, at 882 (reviewing post-amendment disability claims 
by cancer survivors and finding that more claims were filed with the EEOC and resolved favorably 
to plaintiffs, that courts denied defendants’ pre-trial motions based on lack of disability more 
frequently, and that no court had determined that a cancer survivor was “too healthy to be disabled, 
yet too ill to work”). The exceptions, where cancer was not found disabling, are pro se cases that 
failed to survive motions to dismiss. See Fierro v. Knight Transp., No. EP-12-CV-00218-DCG, 
2012 WL 4321304, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2012) (finding plaintiff did not allege facts from 
which the court could infer any limitation on major life activities); Brandon v. O’Mara, No. 10-CV-
5174-RJH, 2011 WL 4478492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (finding that because of plaintiff’s limited 
allegations of fatigue and lifting limitations upon her return to work after cancer treatment, her 
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judgment,
190
 and in some cases a favorable settlement has been 
reached.
191
 EEOC experts note that more cases are surviving summary 
judgment motions and more cases turn on whether the statute has been 
violated, rather than whether the plaintiff is covered by the statute.
192
 A 
recent study confirmed that prior to the amendments, courts decided 
74.4% of disability status summary judgment motions in favor of the 
employer, while subsequent to the amendments, the percentage dropped 
to 45.9%.
193
 The percentage of cases in which the courts reached the 
issue and decided whether the plaintiff was a qualified individual with a 
disability jumped from 28.2% pre-amendments to 47.1% post-
amendments.
194
 Thus, more plaintiffs successfully proved disability 
status and moved to the question of whether they were qualified to do 
the job, with or without accommodations. Accordingly, whether the 
ADA is likely to provide real benefit to cancer survivors who want to 
continue to work depends on the interpretation of the discrimination and 
                                                     
complaint failed to state a claim that she was disabled). Unlike other cases, see infra note 190, these 
courts did not consider the fact that cancer in remission is a disability because of its impact on 
normal cell growth when active. One scholar has described these as poorly litigated cases that might 
come out differently with better advocacy. Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 87 
TENN. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
190. Katz v. Adecco USA, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment, finding cancer in remission was a disability); Norton v. Assisted 
Living Concepts, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (denying motion for summary judgment, 
finding cancer in remission was a disability); Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc., 737 F. 
Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding 
plaintiff’s renal cell cancer was a disability, even in remission); Chalfont v. U.S. Electrodes, No. 10-
2929, 2010 WL 5341846, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2010) (rejecting motion to dismiss on the ground 
that plaintiff’s leukemia, which was in remission, did not constitute a disability); see also Meinelt v. 
P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 643 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (denying a summary 
judgment motion arguing that brain tumor was not a disability where case does not state whether the 
brain tumor was malignant or benign).  
191. See Consent Decree, EEOC v. Southlake Comm. Mental Health Ctr., No. 2:10-CV-00444-
PPS-APR (N.D. Ind. Mar, 11, 2013) (settling claim that employer failed to provide reasonable 
accommodation and terminated employee for missing work when she sought leave for breast cancer 
treatment. Settlement required employer to consider leave as an accommodation even where 
employees were not entitled to FMLA leave); Consent Decree, EEOC v. Journal Disposition Corp., 
No. 10-CV-00886-RHB (W.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2011) (settling claim by employee that employer 
denied accommodation allowing employee to work part-time, and instead terminated him). 
192. Patrick Dorrian, EEOC Attorney, Administrative Judge Share Insights, Tips About Amended 
ADA, 196 DAILY LAB. REP. A-5 (Oct. 5, 2012); see also Kevin M. Barry, Exactly What Congress 
Intended?, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 5, 27 (2013) (noting that early judicial interpretations of 
the ADAAA appear to be in accord with congressional intent to reverse restrictive interpretations of 
the definition of disability). 
193. See Steven F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA 
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2050–51 (2013). 
194. Id. at 2055. 
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accommodation requirements, as well as the requirement that the 
plaintiff be a qualified individual with a disability.
195
 
3. Qualified Individuals with a Disability 
In passing the ADA, Congress recognized that, unlike many other 
groups protected from discrimination, discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities might be justified if the disability prevented the 
individual from doing the job. Accordingly, the law bars only 
discrimination against “qualified” individuals with disabilities.196 A 
qualified individual with a disability can perform the essential functions 
of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation by the 
employer.
197
 The issue as it arises in practice is typically intertwined 
with the issues of discrimination and accommodation. Thus, the 
employer may admit it acted on the basis of the disability but claim that 
the disability prevented the employee from meeting the job 
qualifications.
198
 The employer may also assert that there is no 
reasonable accommodation that would enable the employee to meet the 
job qualifications that can be provided without undue hardship.
199
 
Professor Befort’s research shows that post-ADAAA, employers are 
winning more summary judgment motions based on qualified status.
200
 
Professor Porter has suggested an explanation for this.
201
 The analysis of 
essential functions of the job is more structured by the statute than the 
                                                     
195. Of course, it is always possible that early indications may not be an accurate predictor of 
later developments. One of the very earliest ADA cases involved an executive with brain cancer 
who successfully sued his employer, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 
1995), but as the law developed, plaintiffs’ victories were few and far between as noted supra. The 
amendments did not change the law’s definition of disability and the EEOC regulations can always 
be circumvented by the courts. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 30, at 86-7; Kate Webber, Correcting 
the Supreme Court—Will It Listen? Using the Models of Judicial Decision-Making to Predict the 
Future of the ADA Amendments Act, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 305, 350–52 (2014) (indicating that 
even if lower courts are currently interpreting the ADA Amendments Act consistently with 
congressional intent, the Supreme Court may not do so). 
196. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). 
197. Id. § 12111(8). 
198. See, e.g., McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 124–25, 127 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(reversing summary judgment for the employer which was granted on the basis that the employee 
could not meet the job qualification of arriving on time for work because of his disability). 
199. See, e.g., Spears v. Creel, No. 14-12261, 2015 WL 1651646 (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2015) 
(accepting employer’s claim that there was no available reasonable accommodation for employee 
with cancer that could be provided without undue hardship). 
200. Befort, supra note 193, at 2055 (showing increase in employer wins on summary judgment 
motions based on qualified status from 47.9% of cases to 69.7% of cases). 
201. Porter, supra note 189, at 57. 
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vague notion of reasonableness, which has never been defined by the 
Supreme Court.
202
 Thus the essential functions analysis is easier for the 
courts to use, particularly in granting summary judgment to the 
employer.
203
 There is often an aspect of the job that the employee cannot 
do.
204
 If the court finds that to be an essential function, the law does not 
require that function to be eliminated or reassigned.
205
 An 
accommodation is only possible if it allows modification, but not 
elimination, of one of the essential functions of the job or if the 
accommodation eliminates a non-essential or marginal function of the 
job.
206
 
Professor Porter’s analysis of the cases suggests that while courts are 
willing to require employers to accommodate employees with physical 
adjustments to the workplace, such as providing equipment, they are 
often unwilling to require employers to make structural changes in the 
workplace as accommodations.
207
 An example of this phenomenon from 
our hypothetical survivor, Sarah, would be a characterization of working 
her regular shift as an essential function of the job. Sarah’s inability to 
work that shift daily as a result of her treatment would render her 
unqualified. This, of course, has important implications for cancer 
survivors like Sarah that are explored in the following sections. 
Alternatively, of course, the employer may claim that any challenged 
action was based on another reason having nothing to do with the 
individual’s disability. In such cases, the employer may or may not 
contest the employee’s ability to meet the definition of “qualified 
individual.” Because of the relationship between qualified individual 
with a disability and accommodation, qualified individual with a 
disability will be discussed further in connection with accommodations. 
4. Hiring, Termination, and Other Discrimination 
Where the employer denies any disability-related discrimination, 
there is nothing unique about discrimination claims under the ADA once 
disability is established.
208
 The key to proving discrimination is showing 
                                                     
202. Id. at 55–56. 
203. Id. at 56. 
204. Id. at 57. 
205. Id.  
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 54–55, 57. 
208. What is unique about ADA claims as compared to those under other discrimination laws, 
however, is that the more common ADA case is one where the employer admits to relying on the 
disability but claims that the employee is not qualified because of the disability.  
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that the employer’s adverse actions are based on the disability and not on 
other factors. This motive-based inquiry is fact-specific and will depend 
on the evidence in the particular case, including the timing of the 
employer’s actions and any other evidence that suggests a motive based 
on the employee’s cancer.209 
The particular issues that are most likely to arise for cancer patients in 
these pure discrimination cases are termination or discipline of an 
employee allegedly based on the employee’s cancer or failure to hire an 
employee who has a history of cancer.
210
 In the case of hypothetical 
survivor Sarah, the employer’s recently instituted criticism of her 
performance may be discrimination based on her cancer and could 
ultimately lead to termination. Alternatively, her performance may in 
fact be deteriorating, which would provide a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for discipline and, without improvement, 
discharge.
211
 The success of any challenge to the employer’s action 
would depend on the evidence as to the employer’s motive. 
An example from an actual case is Crane v. Monterrey Mushroom, 
Inc.,
212
 where the court denied an employer’s summary judgment 
motion. In that case, Crane brought claims of discrimination based on 
his diagnosis of prostate cancer and intent to take leave under the FMLA 
for treatment.
213
 The employer eliminated Crane’s position shortly after 
his diagnosis, and he alleged he was discriminatorily selected for 
                                                     
209. The standard for proof on the issue of causation under the ADA is unsettled. See Quillen v. 
Touchstone Med. Imaging LLC, 15 F. Supp. 3d 774, 780 n.10 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (discussing split 
of courts on standard of proof and impact of University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. 
Nassar, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), which required proof of “but for” causation for 
retaliation claims under Title VII); Gallagher v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 14 F. Supp. 3d 1380 
(S.D. Cal. 2014) (applying the Nassar standard to ADA retaliation claim); Siring v. Or. State Bd. of 
Higher Educ., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062–63 (D. Or. 2013) (refusing to apply the Nassar standard 
to discrimination claims under the ADA). 
210. The ADA protects individuals with a record of a disability and individuals who are regarded 
as having a disability but do not. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B)–(C) (2012). Pre-amendment studies of 
EEOC claims found termination claims to be more prevalent for cancer survivors as compared to 
claims by individuals with other conditions. Feuerstein et al., supra note 176, at 189. Also more 
common were claims relating to inequitable application of terms and conditions of employment. Id. 
These claims, like termination and hiring claims, will typically depend on proof of motive. Hiring 
cases were not common among claims filed by cancer survivors, perhaps because of proof 
difficulties. Id. at 188. For further discussion of proof problems, see infra notes 219–21 and 
accompanying text. 
211. Accommodation, discussed infra Part VI.B.5, might be relevant in such a determination also. 
If Sarah was denied a reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to perform the job 
and then be disciplined or discharged for her failure to perform adequately, the discipline or 
discharge might be found to be discriminatory. 
212. 910 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (E.D. Tenn. 2012). 
213. Id. at 1038. 
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termination.
214
 He had informed his boss in December that he might 
have cancer and gave the supervisor the official diagnosis on January 
13.
215
 Crane was notified of his layoff in early February.
216
 There was 
conflicting evidence about when the decision to terminate was made—
before or after knowledge about the cancer or potential cancer—as well 
as conflicting evidence about whether the decision-maker was angry 
about Crane’s cancer diagnosis and its impact on his work.217 Based on 
this material factual dispute, the court denied summary judgment, 
leaving it to the jury to determine whether the layoff was discriminatory 
or legitimate.
218
 
The reality is that ADA discrimination cases are far more likely to 
challenge terminations than failures to hire.
219
 Hiring cases are difficult 
to win, have limited damages, and often involve plaintiffs with few 
resources, making them unattractive to the plaintiffs’ employment bar.220 
The problems with hiring discrimination cases are not unique to the 
ADA,
221
 nor are the potential fixes. Because of the difficulties with 
hiring cases, most cancer patients will be in a better position under the 
ADA if they can keep the jobs they have rather than leaving the job and 
returning to the work force later.
222
 Employers have an economic 
incentive to avoid hiring someone with a history of cancer, as they fear a 
recurrence that might lead to costly absenteeism or expensive medical 
treatment. A return to the workforce requires an explanation for absence, 
                                                     
214. Id. at 1039–40. 
215. Id. at 1039. 
216. Id. at 1040. 
217. Id. at 1048–50. 
218. The case was dismissed before trial on joint motion of the parties, presumably based on a 
settlement. Joint Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Crane v. Monterey Mushrooms, 
Inc., 910 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (No. 3:10-CV-00149). 
219. SAMUEL BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 127 (2009). 
220. Id. at 127–28. The EEOC has brought several hiring claims for cancer survivors, however. 
See EEOC v. Dyn McDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 537 F. App’x 437, 448 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(reversing summary judgment for employer on EEOC claims that employee was not hired because 
of his age and his wife’s cancer); EEOC v. Prof’l Freezing Servs., LLC, 15 F. Supp. 3d 783 (N.D. 
Ill. 2013) (alleging failure to hire because of prostate cancer and settled with consent decree); 
Complaint, EEOC v. SITA Info. Networking Computing USA, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-02818-RLV (N.D. 
Ga. Aug. 24, 2011) (alleging rescission of employment offer because of diagnosis of cancer and 
request for accommodation); Consent Decree, EEOC v. SITA Info. Networking Computing USA, 
Inc., No. 1:11-cv-02818-RLV (N.D. Ga. May 6, 2013) (settling the dispute). 
221. BAGENSTOS, supra note 219, at 127 n.50. 
222. Evidence of persistent unemployment of cancer survivors suggests that survivors may have 
difficulty finding employment after leaving the work force for cancer treatment. Employment-
Contingent Health Insurance, supra note 103, at 732. 
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and since any hiring discrimination will be difficult to prove,
223
 it is most 
useful to look at how the ADA might enable employees with cancer to 
retain their employment. 
5. Reasonable Accommodation 
A widespread finding of the cancer studies was that employer 
accommodation and support was an important factor in continued 
employment of cancer patients.
224
 This finding applied regardless of the 
demographic characteristics of the cancer patients, the type of cancer, or 
the type of work.
225
 These findings indicate the significance of the 
accommodation requirement of the ADA. Accommodations found to be 
particularly important were flexible work schedules, paid sick leave, 
assistance with job tasks, and control over the type and amount of 
work.
226
 These accommodations are among the most difficult for 
employers for they require flexibility in work planning and impose 
burdens on both employers and employees due to workplace 
restructuring and employee absence.
227
 
The ADA states reasonable accommodation may include: 
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily 
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and 
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of 
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications 
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of 
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar 
                                                     
223. As just one example, an employer can screen out applicants with employment gaps based on 
resumes or applications. The applicant will never know the reason for the rejection. Unless an 
applicant is uniquely highly qualified for a particular position, showing a rejection is based on 
disability or history of a disability rather than some other reason is extremely difficult. 
224. See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text. 
225. Interestingly, a pre-amendment study of ADA claims (covering the years 2000–05) did not 
find a high incidence of failure to accommodate claims filed by cancer survivors as compared to 
those with other disabilities. Feuerstein et al., supra note 176, at 188. This result seems anomalous 
given the importance of accommodation to the maintenance of employment revealed by numerous 
studies. The authors hypothesized that uncertainty about the need and availability of 
accommodations might explain the lower rate of claims. Id. at 189–90. It may also reflect the fact 
that some desired accommodations would not give rise to a viable legal claim, such as emotional 
support from the employer and fellow employees. See Yu et al., supra note 98, at 215 (finding two 
of the most common reported negative employment experiences of cancer survivors were lack of 
support by employer and coworkers). 
226. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
227. Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues: 
Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 441–42 (2002). 
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accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
228
 
Accommodations are assessed on an individualized basis. What may 
be reasonable in one employment situation may not be in another. The 
regulations recommend an interactive process between employers and 
employees to determine whether an accommodation is possible, and the 
courts have affirmed the importance of the interactive process.
229
 In 
determining whether an accommodation is reasonable, the first question 
is whether it is reasonable on its face or in most employment settings.
230
 
If the employee makes that showing, the second question is whether the 
employer can show that the accommodation would cause undue hardship 
in the particular situation at issue.
231
 
Because of the individualized nature of the accommodation inquiry 
and the inclusive nature of the accommodation definition, there is 
always a possibility that an individual with cancer can be 
accommodated. To assess the effectiveness of the law for cancer 
survivors generally, however, it is useful to look at how the EEOC and 
the courts have interpreted the law with respect to the accommodations 
deemed most important by survivors. 
a. Leave as a Reasonable Accommodation 
Research clearly shows that some cancers create long-term 
employment effects. Some survivors are still unable to work or unable to 
work full-time twelve to eighteen months after diagnosis.
232
 An 
employer’s willingness to provide continued flexibility for the employee 
with cancer is a key accommodation enabling retention of employment, 
which may require time off or reduced hours for some employees. 
Accordingly, leave will often be important in enabling survivors to 
remain employed.
233
 As discussed above, the FMLA requires up to 
                                                     
228. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012). 
229. See Bielich v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 589, 620 (W.D. Pa. 2014); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(o)(3) (2014); FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 4.08 
(2009), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_civ_instruc_2009.pdf 
(stating that both parties must cooperate in interactive process).  
230. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401–02 (2002). 
231. Id. at 402. Undue hardship is “significant difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). 
232. See supra notes 56–57, 60–61, 72, 81, 93–95 and accompanying text. 
233. See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding employer did 
not violate Rehabilitation Act by failing to extend six month leave for professor when she was 
unable to return from leave after cancer treatment as her inability to work meant she was not able to 
perform the essential functions of the job); Complaint, EEOC v. Children’s Hosp. & Research Ctr., 
No. 4:13-CV-05715 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2013) (alleging that employee with breast cancer given six 
month leave and terminated when she requested an additional two month leave); Complaint, 
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twelve weeks unpaid leave in a twelve-month period, including 
intermittent leave, which provides some accommodation for cancer 
survivors that meet its eligibility requirements.
234
 The ADA can 
supplement FMLA leave.
235
 For employees in smaller workplaces, with 
less than fifty but at least fifteen employees, or employees who do not 
yet qualify for FMLA leave, the ADA can substitute. 
An important limitation on ADA leave, however, is that, unlike the 
FMLA, the statute does not expressly require continuation of health 
insurance during leave.
236
 If the employer continues insurance for 
employees on other leaves, however, employees with disabilities cannot 
be treated differently.
237
 
i. Paid Leave 
Paid sick leave is easily dispatched. It is not a required 
accommodation under the ADA. However, the EEOC’s Enforcement 
Guidance, issued to advise employers and individuals about rights and 
responsibilities under the law, does indicate that an employer may be 
required to modify its existing paid leave policies to allow an employee 
to use paid leave to accommodate a disability.
238
 Nor does the FMLA 
require paid leave unless it is otherwise available under the employer’s 
policies.
239
 Thus, paid leave is in the discretion of the employer unless 
required by state or local law.
240
 About sixty-seven percent of workers 
                                                     
Rozenfeld v. Neurological Assocs. of Long Island, P.C., No. 2:13-CV-04509 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 
2013) (alleging employer failed to accommodate plaintiff by providing six month leave for 
treatment of brain cancer, instead deeming plaintiff permanently disabled under employment 
contract and terminating her); Consent Decree, EEOC v. Southlake Comm. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 
No. 2:10-CV-00444 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 11, 2013) (settling case of employee fired for absenteeism after 
requesting leave for breast cancer treatment). 
234. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
235. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b) (2014) (indicating that leave is a reasonable accommodation 
absent undue hardship). 
236. Ivelisse Bonilla, Cancer as a Disability After the American with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act, 59 FED. LAW. 12, 1 (2012).  
237. Id. 
238. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT ¶ 24 
(2002) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE] (citing Dutton v. Johnson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 
868 F. Supp. 1260, 1264–65 (D. Kan. 1994)), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/accommodation.html (finding discrimination where employer refused to allow employee to use 
paid vacation leave to accommodate disability although employee could not meet requirement of 
advance notice for scheduling vacation). 
239. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
240. For a summary of current legislation, see NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, PAID SICK 
DAYS STATUTES (2015), available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/work-
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currently have some paid sick leave, while only thirty-seven percent 
have some form of short term disability benefits.
241
 Although a few 
states and localities require some employers to provide paid sick leave, 
most require only five days and some even fewer.
242
 This is far less than 
almost all cancer patients would need to cover the absences required. 
Additionally, many statutes limit coverage. For example, Connecticut’s 
law covers only some hourly service workers, excluding manufacturing 
employees, those working for employers with less than fifty employees, 
salaried workers, temporary workers, and others.
243
 In addition to the 
paid leave laws, a few states have public disability insurance programs 
similar to unemployment insurance that apply to many employers and 
provide partial pay for disability from a state-administered fund.
244
 
There is increasing pressure for paid sick leave for many purposes, 
however, and state and local legislative campaigns exist in many 
locations.
245
 Each additional law requiring paid leave improves cancer 
survivors’ ability to maintain employment. Unpaid leave is a different 
story. 
ii. Unpaid Leave 
The EEOC has been active on the issue of leaves of absence as 
reasonable accommodations in recent years, and in 2011 it held a public 
meeting to evaluate the topic. At that meeting, EEOC commissioners 
confirmed that leave as an accommodation must be considered on a 
case-by-case basis, but also indicated that additional guidance would be 
forthcoming to help employers and employees better deal with this 
particularly difficult issue.
246
 
                                                     
family/psd/paid-sick-days-statutes.pdf. 
241. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 3 PROGRAM PERSPECTIVES 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/archive/program-perspectives-on-sick-leave-and-disability-benefit-
combinations-pdf.pdf. 
242. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 240. 
243. Id. The recently enacted Massachusetts law has broader coverage, requiring employers with 
eleven or more employees to provide up to forty hours of paid sick leave with smaller employers 
required to provide equivalent unpaid leave. Id. 
244. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS 8-1, 
available at http://www.unemploymentinsurance.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilawcompar/2014/ 
disability.pdf. These programs are discussed further infra notes 410–13 and accompanying text. 
245. For a summary of current and pending legislation requiring paid sick time at the state and 
local level, see NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, STATE AND LOCAL ACTION ON PAID SICK 
DAYS (2015), available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/campaigns/psd/state-
and-local-action-paid-sick-days.pdf. 
246. Peter J. Petesch, EEOC Moves Toward Guidance Addressing Leave as a Reasonable 
Accommodation Under the ADA, BNA INSIGHTS: LAB. & EMP. L. (June 6, 2011). Such guidance has 
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The commissioners noted that some employer “best practices” were 
likely to be encouraged in future policy guidance. For example, they 
concluded that finite leave of absence policies, without built-in 
flexibility, were problematic.
247
 While extended leave allowances need 
not be expressly provided in the policy, some indication of a procedure 
to deal with extenuating circumstances would be helpful to avoid 
employee confusion. Even if a policy provides a substantial leave period, 
it will likely be insufficient if it does not provide for individualized 
exceptions. Additionally, communication between employers and 
employees on leave is crucial, as the employer has a duty to engage in an 
interactive accommodation process. Future EEOC actions may indeed 
focus on employers who provide leave initially, but terminate the 
accommodations too early in the process, before they have exhausted all 
avenues of communication.
248
 
Recent EEOC cases have targeted inflexible leave policies, reflecting 
the current agency view that exceptions must be made in some 
situations.
249
 In 2011, the EEOC received its largest ADA-related 
settlement ever from Verizon Communications. The company paid 
twenty million dollars to resolve a lawsuit alleging that its “no fault” 
leave policy failed to take into account the need for leave as a reasonable 
accommodation.
250
 Similarly, the EEOC settled a suit with the Denny’s 
                                                     
not been forthcoming as of yet, however. Kevin P. McGowan, EEOC Officials , Attorneys  Discuss  
Priorities  Under Agency’s Strategic Enforcement Plan, 42 EMP. DISC. REP. (BNA) 125 (Jan. 16, 
2014). 
247. Petesch, supra note 246. 
248. Id. 
249. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09–cv–05291, 2013 WL 140604, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2013), appeal denied 2013 WL 2628795 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013); EEOC v. 
United Rd. Towing, Inc., No. 10-CV-06259, 2012 WL 1830099, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012); 
EEOC v. Princeton HealthCare Sys., No. 10–4126, 2012 WL 1623870, at *1 (D.N.J. May 9, 2012); 
EEOC v. Supervalu, Inc., No. 09-CV-05637, 2010 WL 5071196, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2010). 
Each of the cases was resolved by consent decree except the United Parcel Service case, which 
continues in litigation. See Consent Decree, EEOC v. United Rd. Towing, No. 10-CV-06259, 2012 
WL 1830099 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2012); Consent Decree, EEOC v. Princeton HealthCare Sys., No. 
3:10-cv-04126-PGS-DEA (D.N.J. June 25, 2014); Consent Decree, EEOC v. Supervalu Inc., No. 
1:09-CV-05637, (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2011). On July 15, 2014, a magistrate recommended that the 
district court grant the EEOC’s motion for civil contempt sanctions against Supervalu for violation 
of the consent decree. EEOC v. Supervalu, Inc., No. 09-CV-05637, 2014 WL 6787073, at *21. But 
see Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1161–63 (10th Cir. 2014) (rejecting employee’s 
argument that an inflexible six-month sick leave policy violated the Rehabilitation Act and finding 
that a refusal to provide additional leave to recover from cancer did not violate the law, although 
employer offered yearlong sabbaticals for some employees). 
250. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Verizon to Pay $20 Million to Settle 
Nationwide EEOC Disability Suit (July 6, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
eeoc/newsroom/release/7-6-11a.cfm. 
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restaurant chain, alleging that the employer maintained a maximum 
medical leave policy that automatically denied all leave beyond a pre-
determined limit, even if additional leave was required by the ADA.
251
 
In 2014, however, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that an 
inflexible leave policy was inherently discriminatory.
252
 
In general, courts have followed the EEOC guidance and the ADA’s 
legislative history and recognized leave as an appropriate form of 
accommodation.
253
 However, differences arise over the amount of leave 
that is considered reasonable. Most courts have held that employers do 
not have to accommodate workers who require an indefinite period of 
leave.
254
 For example, the Eighth Circuit has held that “a request for an 
indefinite leave of absence . . . is not a reasonable accommodation under 
the ADA.”255 In that case, the court concluded that an employee with 
ovarian cancer could not be considered “otherwise qualified” under the 
ADA because she could not perform her duties as a store manager while 
on leave to undergo chemotherapy.
256
 Federal courts of appeals have 
reached similar conclusions in the First,
257
 Fourth,
258
 Fifth,
259
 Sixth,
260
 
                                                     
251. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Denny’s to Pay $1.3 Million to 
Settle EEOC Disability Discrimination Lawsuit (June 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-27-11b.cfm. For additional settlements, see Written 
Testimony of John Hendrickson, Regional Attorney, EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION (June 8, 2011), available at http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/6-8-
11/hendrickson.cfm. 
252. Hwang, 753 F.3d at 1164 (suggesting that inflexible policies can benefit individuals with 
disabilities by their transparency, clarity, and consistency). 
253. Befort, supra note 227, at 459–60. 
254. The EEOC’s 2008 Guidance also reflects this view. See The Americans with Disabilities 
Act: Applying Performance and Conduct Standards to Employees with Disabilities, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/performance-conduct.html (last 
updated Jan. 20, 2011). 
255. Peyton v. Fred’s Stores of Ark., Inc., 561 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2009). 
256. Id. 
257. See Fiumara v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 327 F. App’x 212, 213 (2009) 
(“Similarly, indefinite leave is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.”). 
258. See Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that the ADA contains “no 
reference to an individual’s future ability to perform the essential functions of his position”). 
259. See Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, 87 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that an ability to 
appear for work is an essential aspect of any job); Harville v. Tex. A&M Univ., 833 F. Supp. 2d 
645, 661 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (“Where attendance is an essential aspect of the job, an individual who 
has frequent absences is unqualified.”). 
260. See Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1998) (ruling 
against an employee with a shoulder injury who failed to state when she would return to work and 
was terminated after a year’s leave). But see Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 
775, 783 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a genuine issue of fact as to whether an eight-week leave of 
absence followed by a request for an additional one-month leave was a reasonable accommodation). 
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Seventh,
261
 Tenth,
262
 and Eleventh
263
 Circuits. A leave of absence with 
an anticipated date of return that cannot be predicted with medical 
certainty, however, is not a request for indefinite leave.
264
 
Therefore, some of these circuits have agreed with EEOC 
recommendations that it is reasonable for employers to grant successive 
requests or requests for a definite period of extended leave, as long as 
the accommodation does not unduly burden the employer. In 2000, the 
First Circuit concluded that an employer would suffer no hardship if it 
granted extra leave to a secretary with cancer who had already had 
considerable absences, since her temporary replacements were able to 
perform her duties with no loss to efficiency.
265
 Likewise, in Cehrs v. 
Northeast Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Center,266 the Sixth Circuit found 
a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether an additional request for 
one month off following an initial eight-week leave of absence was 
reasonable.
267
 The Cehrs court criticized the “presumption that 
uninterrupted attendance is an essential job requirement.”268 If 
attendance is treated as an essential requirement, the employer would 
                                                     
261. See EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 950–51 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a 
dockworker’s request for unlimited sick days to accommodate Kaposi’s sarcoma was not a 
reasonable accommodation, and due to his record of frequent absences, he could not be considered 
“qualified”). 
262. See Lara v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 121 F. App’x 796, 801 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that employee was not entitled to three months additional leave or to substitute accrued vacation 
time for disability leave, because there was no reliable evidence of the expected duration of the 
impairment); Cisneros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d 1113, 1128–30 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding an employee 
whose doctor did not indicate the duration of her impairment was not entitled to leave as a 
reasonable accommodation); Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(holding extended leave after one year not reasonable where a delivery driver had told the company 
that he would never be able to return to work as a driver and could not say when he would be able to 
work at all); Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1168–69 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding 
leave was not a reasonable accommodation where there was no evidence of the duration of the 
impairment other than that it would not be permanent). 
263. Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003). 
264. See Written Testimony of Brian East Senior Attorney Texas Disability Rights, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 9 (June 8, 2011) [hereinafter Testimony of Brian East], available 
at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/6-8-11/east.cfm (citing cases). 
265. García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 649 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Reed 
v. Jefferson Parrish Sch. Bd., No. 12-2758, 2014 WL 2589152 (E.D. La. Apr. 22, 2014) (finding 
plaintiff who sought an additional two weeks of leave after a six-month leave of absence was 
qualified and there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the additional leave would cause undue 
hardship for the employer). 
266. 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998). 
267. Id. at 783. But see Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 727 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(interpreting case law among several circuits to suggest that a request for medical leave in excess of 
eighteen months would likely be unreasonable). 
268. 155 F.3d at 782.  
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have no burden to show that a leave would cause undue hardship.
269
 
Further, the individualized inquiry that the ADA requires in disability 
discrimination cases would be eliminated.
270
 
Whether an extended leave of absence poses an undue burden on the 
employer depends on many different factors, including the resources of 
the particular employer, and the cost or difficulty involved in providing a 
particular accommodation.
271
 While the First Circuit has found that over 
a year of leave could be considered reasonable,
272
 the Eighth Circuit, 
under a different set of circumstances, found that a leave of six months 
would be unduly burdensome.
273
 In Epps v. City of Pine Lawn,
274
 the 
court held that a small municipal government could not feasibly 
reallocate a police officer’s duties among a small staff over a six-month 
period.
275
 
Courts also take varying views as to whether an employer needs to 
accommodate periods of intermittent leave resulting from chronic 
illness. Several circuits have dealt with the issue by determining whether 
regular attendance is an essential job function—and in some cases have 
found it to be.
276
 The Fifth Circuit, in particular, has held that attendance 
is essential for any job.
277
 Where attendance is essential to the job, courts 
have concluded that a person whose disability causes poor attendance is 
not “otherwise qualified.”278 As discussed infra with respect to 
                                                     
269. Id.  
270. Id. 
271. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2012). 
272. García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 647 (1st Cir. 2000). 
273. Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 2003). 
274. 353 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 2003). 
275. Id. at 592 n.5. 
276. Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996); Tyndall v. Nat’l 
Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that reliable attendance is “a necessary 
element of most jobs”). 
277. Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759 (“[A]n essential element of any . . . job is an ability to appear for 
work . . . and to complete assigned tasks within a reasonable period of time.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994))). But see Carmona v. Sw. Airlines Co., 
604 F.3d 848, 860 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that an employee’s irregular attendance did not render 
him unqualified where the employer’s attendance policy was extremely lenient and the employee 
had remained compliant with the policy for seven years, despite his irregular attendance). 
278. Grubb v. Sw. Airlines, 296 F. App’x 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Lack of physical presence is 
a commonly-accepted disqualification for ADA protection.”); see also Colón-Fontánez v. 
Municipality of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 33–34 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding that an employee suffering 
from fibromyalgia was not qualified because she was absent at least twenty percent of her scheduled 
work time for ten years); Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 278–79 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(finding housekeeping aide with rheumatoid arthritis was not qualified because he had unpredictable 
sporadic absences and consistent attendance was required by the job). 
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modifications of work schedules,
279
 assessing this issue under the rubric 
of whether the individual is qualified is problematic. As the court in 
Cehrs noted, this relieves the employer of the obligation to show that 
leave to recover from illness or its effects causes any hardship.
280
 
Further, attendance is not a job function at all, as defined by the 
regulations.
281
 Certainly, erratic or simply poor attendance can be 
problematic for an employer in many cases, but analyzing the issue 
under the undue hardship prong allows for consideration of the particular 
job, the needs of the employer, and the circumstances of the employee in 
assessing whether leave is a required accommodation under the law. 
In accord with this approach, courts in other circuits have analyzed all 
the relevant circumstances to determine whether a series of repeated 
absences disqualifies an employee from performing essential job 
functions.
282
 In Brannon v. Luco Mop Co.,
283
 the Eighth Circuit 
considered several factors to conclude that a diabetic employee with toe 
and foot amputations was not qualified.
284
 She was absent forty of 
seventy-seven work days prior to termination, postponed return dates 
three times, and failed to demonstrate that having additional time off to 
recuperate would enable her to have more consistent attendance.
285
 In 
Carlson v. InaCom Corp.,
286
 the court held that an employee was 
qualified, despite her absences, when the employer presented no 
evidence to establish that the absences resulted in essential business not 
being completed in a timely and efficient manner.
287
 
Current law seems fairly clear that definite leave of a limited duration 
should be considered as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, 
                                                     
279. See infra notes 330–38 and accompanying text. 
280. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.  
281. See Testimony of Brian East, supra note 264 (citing, inter alia, EEOC regulations defining 
job functions). 
282. See Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1135 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting 
that regular attendance is not per se an essential job function); Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s 
Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[t]he presumption that uninterrupted 
attendance is an essential job requirement improperly dispenses with the burden-shifting analysis” 
for determining ADA violations); Cook v. R.I. Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 
F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Unless absenteeism rises to a level such that the applicant is no longer 
‘otherwise qualified,’ the Rehabilitation Act requires employers to bear absenteeism and other 
miscellaneous burdens involved in making reasonable accommodations in order to permit the 
employment of disabled persons.”). 
283. 521 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2008). 
284. Id. at 848–49. 
285. Id. 
286. 885 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Neb. 1995). 
287. Id. at 1321. 
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while indefinite leave in most cases is not required. In some cases, 
however, courts have found regular attendance to be an essential job 
function, which limits even the accommodation of a finite leave.
288
 More 
difficult questions are presented in cases where the type of leave 
requested falls somewhere in between—extended periods of leave, 
successive leave requests, and multiple brief absences. These are fact-
specific determinations that often turn on issues such as whether the job 
requires a physical presence, the length of the leave, or how much of a 
burden the employee’s absence places on the employer. In some cases 
they will depend on whether the court presumes that attendance is an 
essential function or considers whether accommodating the particular 
absences causes undue hardship. Telecommuting and multiple brief 
absences will be explored further in the job flexibility section below. 
b. Job Flexibility as an Accommodation 
The literature on cancer and work indicates that flexibility in work is 
an important accommodation in enabling continued employment. 
Several possible accommodations might provide such flexibility, 
including reassigning some tasks to other employees, providing 
equipment to assist in physical tasks, rest breaks or altered schedules for 
survivors suffering from fatigue, and working from home. Data on 
workplace flexibility, however, reveal that less than half of workers have 
flexible hours and less than forty percent have flexibility in work 
days.
289
 Sarah’s job difficulties suggest that a more flexible approach 
might provide needed accommodations that enable her to keep her job. 
The ability to change shifts for her treatment is one such 
accommodation. If her performance is in fact deficient, perhaps it is due 
to the effects of treatment, and rest breaks or assistive equipment might 
help. Each of these accommodations has been addressed by the EEOC 
and the courts. 
i. Providing Assistive Equipment 
An example from a recent case illustrates the need for 
                                                     
288. See, e.g., Basden v. Prof’l Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1037–38 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding 
attendance to be an essential function and rejecting claim of employee with multiple sclerosis who 
was fired despite her request for a thirty-day leave where the court did not believe the employee 
established that the leave would have enabled her to return to work on a regular and predictable 
basis). 
289. Glynn & Farrell, supra note 150, at 5. As in the case of paid leaves, Latinos and African-
Americans are less likely to have these benefits than other workers. Id. 
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accommodations for physical limitations.
290
 A support services assistant 
at a law firm had lifting restrictions resulting from cancer treatment.
291 
The job required moving heavy boxes of documents and occasionally 
moving machines on wheels.
292 
The complaint alleged that the employer 
initially allowed the assistant to use a cart to move heavy boxes and to 
break down boxes of documents to reduce the amount of weight lifted, 
but then refused to continue the accommodation, ultimately firing the 
assistant because of her inability to lift heavy weights.
293
 
First, it appears that lifting these documents was an essential function 
of the job. To be a qualified individual with a disability, the cancer 
survivor must be able to perform the essential functions of the job with 
or without reasonable accommodation. Elimination of essential functions 
is not a reasonable accommodation although reassignment of marginal 
functions can be.
294
 Even if an employee’s inability to perform essential 
functions is temporary, reassignment of those functions is not required 
as an accommodation. At most, the employee might be entitled to a 
reasonable leave pending recovery sufficient to enable performance of 
all job functions. The complaint did not allege that the employer should 
have reassigned these functions, but instead argued that the 
accommodation initially offered was reasonable and enabled her to 
perform the job.
295
 
The assistant requested to be allowed to continue using the equipment 
that enabled her to do the job despite the lifting limitations from the 
cancer. The question is whether this accommodation is reasonable, 
whether it enables her to meet the requirements of her job, and whether 
it causes undue hardship to the employer.
296
 It is certainly possible, if not 
                                                     
290. For another example, see Complaint, EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-00222 
(E.D. Tenn. Oct. 7, 2010) (involving employee with lifting restrictions resulting from cancer who 
was placed on unpaid leave when he could not fill in for another employee who was on break 
because the position required lifting). The case was settled by consent decree in December, 2011. 
Consent Decree, EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. 2:10-CV-00222 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 2011). 
291. See Complaint ¶ 8(f), EEOC v. Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, No. 1:13-CV-00046, 
2014 BL 178305 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 16, 2013). 
292. The employer claimed that the job required lifting of up to seventy-five pounds and pushing 
or pulling machines on wheels weighing up to 700 pounds. Id. ¶ 8(h). 
293. Id. ¶ 8(i)–(l). 
294. See, e.g., Bell v. Hercules Liftboat Co., 524 F. App’x 64, 69 (5th Cir. 2013) (granting 
summary judgment to employer on termination claim of cancer survivor who admitted she could not 
perform eighty percent of her job functions and was only able to return to work because her 
subordinates performed her job functions). 
295. Complaint, supra note 291, ¶ 8(i). 
296. There is disagreement among scholars about whether reasonableness and undue hardship are 
merely different recitations of the same obligation or separate requirements and, if the latter, what is 
 
04 - Hodges.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:47 PM 
2015] WORKING WITH CANCER 1087 
 
likely, that using the cart and breaking down boxes of documents into 
smaller sections slows the assistant in her work. If so, the question 
would be whether it was sufficiently significant to make the 
accommodation unreasonable or to constitute undue hardship in light of 
the size and financial resources of the employer and the impact on 
operations, expenses, and other employees.
297
 In thinking about whether 
the law strikes the appropriate balance, we might ask whether it properly 
considers and balances efficiency and equity or fairness to employees.
298
 
By requiring reasonable accommodation unless the employer shows 
undue hardship, the law requires the employer to bear some cost. Only 
when that cost is unreasonable or undue does the employee lose. 
Another way to look at the question is how the ADA fits with other 
laws and supports for cancer survivors, and where the cost should fall. 
Should we expect the assistant to find another job consistent with her 
limitations if possible? If there is no such job available to her, should 
society support the assistant in some way? Or is it better for society if 
the employer suffers some loss of efficiency, presumably either passed 
on to its clients in higher costs, its other employees in reduced wages 
and benefits, or its partners in reduced profits, to enable the assistant to 
continue working? 
Ultimately, the EEOC’s claim on behalf of the assistant was defeated 
on summary judgment, not because the accommodation discussed above 
was unreasonable but because it did not enable her to do all of the 
essential functions of her job.
299
 The accommodation allowed the 
assistant to do some of her job functions but did not allow her to work at 
several other locations or on Saturdays where assistance was unavailable 
and the objects that needed lifting could not be broken down into smaller 
                                                     
the distinction between the two. Compare Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 47 GA. L. REV. 527, 545–46 (2013) (arguing that the two are 
different requirements and that an accommodation is unreasonable if it alters the fundamental 
employer-employee relationship even if it does not cause the employer undue hardship), with Mark 
C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (2010) 
(arguing that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are “two sides of the same coin”). 
Existing case law does not resolve the question. Porter, supra, at 543–53.  
297. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2012); see also Kravits v. Shinseki, No. 10-861, 2012 WL 
604169, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012) (“Providing more detailed instruction seems tailored to 
address Mr. Kravits’s shortcomings in preparing job vacancy notices and completing other projects. 
While providing this written instruction would surely require an additional expenditure of time and 
resources, it is not clear that the costs would outweigh the benefits or that it would impose an undue 
hardship on the Department.”). 
298. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 30, at 112–13. 
299. EEOC v. Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, No. 1:13-CV-00046, 2014 WL 2916851, 
at *7–8 (M.D.N.C. June 26, 2014). 
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ones. Thus, absent successful appeal,
300
 the assistant will have to find 
another position consistent with her limitations. 
In general, courts seem more receptive to accommodations requiring 
assistive equipment or devices to accommodate physical limitations than 
to accommodations that require changes in established working 
conditions like schedules.
301
 Courts denying employer motions have 
recognized that providing seating,
302
 an air-conditioned vehicle,
303
 a 
special ergonomic keyboard,
304
 voice recognition software,
305
 and even a 
human aide
306
 might be reasonable under some circumstances. While for 
some jobs there will be no assistance sufficient to enable cancer 
survivors to do the job, in other cases, an accommodation may allow a 
survivor with physical limitations, mental effects of treatment, or fatigue 
to continue to work. 
                                                     
300. See Ben James, EEOC Wants 4th Circ. to Revive Womble Carlyle ADA Suit, LAW360 (Sept. 
11, 2014, 3:19 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/576344. 
301. Porter, supra note 189, at 44, 57. 
302. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 568–69 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing 
summary judgment for Wal-Mart finding jury question as to whether applicant with cerebral palsy 
could perform the essential functions of greeter and cashier positions with seating aids such as 
scooter or stool); George v. Roush & Yates Racing Engines, LLC, No. 5:11-CV-00025-RLV, 2012 
WL 3542633, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss where employee alleged 
he was able to perform the essential functions of his job while working from couches and rolling 
about the building on an office chair and was nevertheless terminated); Seim v. Three Eagles 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-CV-3071-DEO, 2011 WL 2149061, at *3 (N.D. Iowa June 1, 2011) 
(finding genuine issue of material fact as to whether employer failed to accommodate on air 
personality by providing a chair); cf. Glow v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1147 
(E.D. Cal. 2009) (finding offer to purchase ergonomic chair for employee with neck and back pain 
was a reasonable accommodation under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act). 
303. See Gooden v. Consumers Energy Co., No. 12-11954, 2013 WL 4805061, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 9, 2013) (denying summary judgment, finding genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether providing an air-conditioned vehicle to a diabetic employee would be a reasonable 
accommodation). 
304. See Kravits v. Shinseki, No. 10-861, 2012 WL 604169, at *7–8 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012) 
(denying summary judgment to employer because employee established genuine issue of material 
fact regarding whether employer refused to reasonably accommodate by providing ergonomic 
keyboard and step-by-step instructions). 
305. See Dentice v. Farmers Ins. Exch., No. 10-CV-00113, 2012 WL 2504046, at *19 (E.D. Wis. 
June 28, 2012) (denying summary judgment for employer on employee’s claim that employer failed 
to accommodate by providing voice activated software); Garza v. Abbott Labs., 940 F. Supp. 1227, 
1243 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (same). 
306. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 142–43 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying 
summary judgment where teacher claimed providing her with an aide would enable her to perform 
all the essential functions of her job). 
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ii. Requests to Work from Home 
Another aspect of job flexibility is working from home. This may not 
be a reasonable accommodation for most hospital employees like Sarah, 
who are often providing direct service to patients,
307
 but would be 
effective for many employees whose work is primarily or exclusively 
computer-based.
308
 
Until recently, few courts had found working from home to be a 
reasonable accommodation. In Rauen v. U.S. Tobacco,
309
 the Seventh 
Circuit held that a software engineer’s request for a home office while 
undergoing treatment for rectal and breast cancer was not reasonable.
310
 
The court stated that “working at home is rarely a reasonable 
accommodation . . . because most jobs require the kind of teamwork, 
personal interaction, and supervision that simply cannot be had in a 
home office situation.”311 
The Seventh Circuit has not foreclosed any possibility of working 
from home as a reasonable accommodation, however. In Waggoner v. 
Olin Corp.,
312
 though the court held that an employee’s work from home 
request was unreasonable, it acknowledged that such an option might be 
reasonable in circumstances where physical attendance is not an 
essential function.
313
 In those cases, the relevant issue becomes whether 
there is an undue hardship on the employer.
314
 The Seventh Circuit thus 
appears to be focusing on attendance as an essential job function. 
The EEOC lists several factors that should be considered in 
                                                     
307. See Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 2012). 
But see Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that 
working at home might be a reasonable accommodation for a medical transcriptionist). 
308. For case examples involving cancer, see Eberle v. Forster & Garbus, LLP, No. 1:14-CV-
01687 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2014) (alleging that employee was denied accommodation of working at 
home and then terminated because of his cancer and the side effects of his treatment, which 
included drowsiness), and Complaint ¶ 11–22, Gregorev v. City of New York, No. 1:14-cv-00909 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2014) (alleging new supervisor unlawfully terminated work at home 
accommodation for plaintiff with multiple myeloma whose immune system might be compromised 
by workplace contact). 
309. 319 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2003). 
310. Id. at 897. 
311. Id. at 896; see also Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a service coordinator’s physical attendance at work was essential because the position 
required supervision and teamwork); Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 
1998) (finding that a bank loan officer was required to work as part of a team, and all members of 
the team needed to be present in the office). 
312. 169 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999). 
313. Id. at 485. 
314. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238. 
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determining the feasibility of allowing an employee to work from home. 
These include the employer’s ability to adequately supervise the 
employee, whether work requires specific tools or equipment that cannot 
be easily replicated at home, or whether the employee requires access to 
documents and information located only in the workplace.
315
 The quality 
of work an employee produces at home may also be a factor.
316
 
More recently, some courts have begun to acknowledge that 
technology has made working at home a more feasible 
accommodation.
317
 Not all courts have been as open to working at home, 
however, despite the availability of technology that enables instant 
communication and virtual meetings. Recently, the Sixth Circuit, in an 
en banc decision in EEOC v. Ford Motor Co.,
318
 recognized that 
telecommuting might be reasonable for some jobs, but adopted the view 
that on-site attendance is an essential function for jobs requiring 
interaction with others.
319
 As the dissent pointed out, this ignores the 
availability of technology that allows virtual interaction and defers 
unnecessarily to the employer’s existing practices without carefully 
examining the particular facts.
320
 
                                                     
315. See Work at Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/telew-ork.html (last updated Oct. 27, 2005). 
316. See Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 867 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that a sales 
representative was not entitled to accommodation of working at home but suggesting that such an 
accommodation would be reasonable in those rare cases where the employee could work at home 
without a diminution in the quality of the employee’s work). 
317. See, e.g., Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Technological advances and 
the evolving nature of the workplace, moreover, have contributed to the facilitative options 
available to employers (although their reasonableness in any given case still must be proven).”); 
Core v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 3:11-CV-00166, 2012 WL 3073418, at *11 
(S.D. Ohio July 30, 2012) (stating that in contrast to earlier cases suggesting that working at home 
would rarely be a reasonable accommodation, in light of changes in technology it would not be 
unusual to find such an accommodation reasonable today); Bixby v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
No. 10-CV-00405, 2012 WL 832889, at *9–10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2012) (stating that earlier cases 
suggesting that working at home would rarely be a reasonable accommodation were decided before 
the internet and technology facilitated remote access to the workplace and other employees); 
Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., No. 2:14-CV-02156-JTF, 2015 WL 4866397 
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 2015) (denying employer summary judgment because of factual issues 
regarding whether physical presence at the job site was essential or whether attorney could perform 
essential functions of the job through telecommuting and whether permitting her to work at home 
would cause the employer undue hardship); Jury Verdict Form, Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & 
Water Div., No. 2:14-CV-02156-JTF (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2015) (finding that the plaintiff was 
qualified and the employer refused to provide a reasonable accommodation). 
318. 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
319. Id. at 762–63. 
320. Id. at 776–77 (Moore, J., dissenting). The en banc court vacated a panel decision that found 
that while attendance might be an essential function, it need not be at the employer’s location if the 
job could be done remotely. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d en 
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With continued advances in technology, telecommuting as an 
accommodation may be more available to cancer survivors in the future. 
But despite technological changes, courts such as the Sixth Circuit in 
Ford Motor Co. remain reluctant to require employers to accommodate 
by changing existing practices requiring actual physical attendance.
321
 In 
addition, many jobs still require workplace presence.
322
 Recent data from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that flexibility in work location is 
not widely available to employees and even less available for Latino and 
African-American workers.
323
 In particular, lower wage jobs often 
require a physical presence in the workplace for either manual labor or 
interaction with customers being served. 
iii. Rest Breaks and Flexible Schedules 
Fatigue is a common complication of cancer and its treatment. 
Flexibility in job schedules and rest breaks may accommodate cancer-
related fatigue and other treatment effects.
324
 Flexible schedules may 
also allow employees like Sarah to obtain needed medical treatment 
without taking leave or losing time from work. Additionally, rest breaks 
or altered schedules may enable a survivor to work a physically or 
mentally taxing job. 
A few states have laws mandating rest breaks
325
 and more require 
meal periods for longer work hours, but many states have no such 
                                                     
banc, 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015). The panel refused to find that the fact that the job required 
teamwork automatically precluded telecommuting. Id. at 644–45. 
321. Cf. McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting “[p]hysical 
presence at or by a specific time is not, as a matter of law, an essential function of all employment” 
and pointing out that a factual inquiry is necessary in each case). 
322. See, e.g., Morris v. Jackson, 994 F. Supp. 2d 38, 48 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding working at home 
would create undue hardship where staff, vendors, and contractors would have to come to the 
employee’s home and change clothes and wash before entering to avoid triggering employee’s 
allergies). 
323. Glynn & Farrell, supra note 150, at 5. 
324. For case examples involving cancer, see EEOC v. Angel Medical Center, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-
00034, 2013 BL 338567 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2014) (alleging that employer failed to accommodate 
by either setting a schedule that would allow employee to work full-time while undergoing 
treatment or transferring her to another department, and then terminated her for failing to work full-
time), and Consent Decree, EEOC v. Journal Disposition Corp., No. 1:10-CV-00886-RHB (W.D. 
Mich. Nov. 10, 2011) (settling case alleging that employer fired employee after exceeding leave 
authorized under employer’s policy despite employee’s request for accommodation of part-time 
work). 
325. See Minimum Paid Rest Period Requirements Under State Law for Adult Employees in 
Private Sector, U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB. (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/rest.htm 
(showing California, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Washington all have state mandated rest breaks).  
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requirements and those that do often have exceptions.
326
 Where no 
express legal requirements exist, work breaks and schedules are set by 
the employer. The EEOC Guidance on interpreting the ADA indicates 
that modified schedules, including rest breaks, are a reasonable 
accommodation absent undue hardship.
327
 Case law also indicates that 
rest breaks may be a reasonable accommodation to allow an employee to 
do a physically demanding job.
328
 Rest breaks, like allowing use of 
equipment that reduces productivity, come with a cost. As in the case of 
the support services assistant discussed above, the question is who 
should bear those costs. Because the statute requires reasonable 
accommodation, it seems that some rest breaks would be reasonable for 
most employers unless the job was a unique one that did not allow either 
interruption or substitution of workers for breaks. For a court that 
viewed meeting a particular schedule as an essential requirement of the 
job simply because it was mandated by the employer, however, an 
employee requiring rest breaks might be found unqualified. An 
important determinant in these cases will be how much deference courts 
will give to the employer’s representation as to essential functions of the 
job. 
Modified work schedules are specifically mentioned in the statute as a 
required accommodation.
329
 Medication, fatigue, or treatment schedules 
may require a schedule modification to enable cancer survivors to work. 
This might include starting later, ending earlier, changing work days or 
times, or reducing hours, for example. 
As several scholars have noted, some courts have been reluctant to 
require employers to change existing workplace structures such as 
                                                     
326. See Minimum Length of Meal Period Required Under State Law for Adult Employees in 
Private Sector, U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB. (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/meal.htm 
(showing that California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Guam, and Puerto Rico all require 
meal periods for longer working hours). All states except New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Vermont 
have established exceptions to their meal period requirements. For example, West Virginia exempts 
any employee who is permitted to eat lunch while working, Colorado excludes certain occupations 
such as teacher, nurse, or other medical professional, and Kentucky, like many states, excludes 
employees who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Id. 
327. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238, ¶¶ 22–23. 
328. See Morton v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 1:12-CV-00028, 2013 WL 3088815, at *4–5 
(N.D. Miss. June 18, 2013) (denying summary judgment for employer based on factual dispute 
where employee with prosthetic leg claimed he could complete twelve hour shift with two ten to 
fifteen minute rest breaks and a thirty minute lunch although he never completed a full shift without 
assistance prior to termination). 
329. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2012). Not surprisingly, the regulations also discuss modified work 
schedules. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2014). 
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schedules to accommodate individuals with disabilities.
330
 A court may 
accomplish this result by characterizing attendance or compliance with a 
particular work schedule as an essential function of the job, thereby 
rendering the employee unqualified.
331
 Professor Travis has identified 
cases where courts upheld refusals to accommodate by reducing 
overtime requirements,
332
 allowing an employee to work part-time rather 
than full-time,
333
 modifying start time and allowing the employee to 
make up delayed starts at the end of the shift,
334
 and modifying a strict 
attendance policy to accommodate absences caused by a disability.
335
 
Professor Porter, writing about post-amendment cases, found a similar 
trend among courts unwilling to require employers to change workplace 
structures to accommodate disabilities.
336
 Like Travis, Porter found 
cases where courts deemed employees unqualified because they needed 
part-time rather than full-time work
337
 or because they could not meet 
the requirements of rigid attendance policies.
338
 
On the other hand, some courts have recognized that requests for 
modification of attendance requirements or schedule changes must be 
considered in light of all the facts and circumstances of the particular 
employment setting, and whether the change would cause undue 
hardship for the employer. In Solomon v. Vilsack,
339
 the court, reversing 
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the employer, found 
that a flexible schedule could be a reasonable accommodation where the 
government budget analyst asked to arrive late and work late as needed 
to accommodate her depression.
340
 The plaintiff submitted sufficient 
                                                     
330. Porter, supra note 189, at 57; Michelle Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of 
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 22–27, 32–36 (2005). 
331. Travis, supra note 330, at 31–32. 
332. Id. at 27 (citing Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
333. Id. at 24–25 (citing Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
334. Id. at 32–33 (citing Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
335. Id. at 33–35 (citing EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2001); 
Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm, Inc., 245 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
336. Porter, supra note 189, at 60. 
337. Id. at 61 (citing White v. Standard Ins. Co., 529 F. App’x 547, 549–50 (6th Cir. 2013)). 
338. Id. at 61–62 (citing Brown v. Honda of Am., No. 2:10-CV-00459, 2012 WL 4061795, at *4–
6 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 14, 2012)); Lewis v. New York City Police Dep’t, 908 F. Supp. 2d 313, 326–27 
(E.D.N.Y., Nov. 9, 2012), aff’d, 537 F. App’x 11 (2d Cir. 2013); Blackard v. Livingston Parish 
Sewer Dist., No. 12-CV-00704-SDD–RLB, 2014 WL 199629 at *3–5 (M.D. La. Jan. 15, 2014); see 
also CATHERINE ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE MOBILIZATION OF THE FAMILY 
AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 23–33 (2010) (discussing cases where courts refused to restructure work 
norms to accommodate individuals with disabilities). 
339. 763 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
340. Id. at 10–11 (citing the ADA’s explicit recognition of this accommodation incorporated by 
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evidence to overcome summary judgment by showing that she had been 
allowed to work a flexible schedule and met all deadlines and, in 
addition, another employee in the same job classification also worked a 
flexible schedule.
341
 The court recognized that while the ability to work 
a consistent, predictable schedule might be necessary for some jobs, it is 
a factual determination dependent on the particular position.
342
 
Ward v. Health Research Institute
343
 offers another example.
344
 The 
court there found a genuine issue of fact as to whether a data entry clerk 
must have a regular rather than a flexible schedule, noting that the 
evidence showed only that the data must be entered before the laboratory 
opened the next day, not that any particular start and ending times were 
necessary or that the plaintiff needed to overlap schedules with other 
employees.
345
 Further, as to supervision, there was conflicting evidence 
as to whether a supervisor needed to be present during all of the 
plaintiff’s work hours.346 The court refused to accept as sufficient the 
employer’s “general statements regarding the snowball effect of such an 
accommodation—it would eliminate employers’ control over the 
workplace and ability to maintain any standards.”347 The court stated that 
“[s]uch an argument runs counter to the general principle behind the 
ADA that imposes a duty on the employer to modify some work rules, 
facilities, terms, or conditions to enable a disabled person to work.”348 
Thus, summary judgment was inappropriate. 
Rigid adherence to workplace structures such as particular schedules 
or attendance requirements will adversely affect the ability of some 
cancer survivors to maintain employment. Such requirements may be 
                                                     
the Rehabilitation Act).  
341. Id. 
342. For a similar case, see McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(finding that a predictable schedule is not essential for all jobs and reversing summary judgment for 
the employer that argued it could not accommodate employee’s unpredictable late arrivals).  
343. 209 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2000). 
344. Travis, supra note 330, at 71–72; see also Croy v. Blue Ridge Bread, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-
00034, 2013 WL 3776802 (W.D. Va. July 15, 2013) (denying employer’s motion to dismiss where 
employee requested reduced work schedule and employer did not identify any undue hardship or 
engage in the interactive process designed to reach a reasonable accommodation); Peirano v. 
Momentive Specialty Chems., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00281, 2012 WL 4959429 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 
2012) (denying employer’s summary judgment motion in case where employee was denied a 
flexible starting time based on employer’s attendance policy and claim that regular and timely 
attendance was essential). 
345. Ward, 209 F.3d at 35–37. 
346. Id. at 37. 
347. Id. at 36. 
348. Id. at 36–37. 
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essential in some jobs. Courts should avoid unquestioning acceptance of 
an employer’s assertion that compliance with set requirements is 
essential, however. Application of a flexible fact-based standard to 
determine whether the particular job truly requires maintenance of 
existing structures will make the workplace more accommodating for 
survivors. Our hypothetical survivor Sarah, for example, has negotiated 
shift changes to accommodate her treatment, but suddenly the employer 
has become averse to the process. Is there truly a hardship on the 
employer that has caused this resistance? If not, such accommodation 
should be permitted. 
c. Reassignment as a Reasonable Accommodation 
If an employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the job 
with reasonable accommodation, the law contemplates reassignment to a 
vacant position. The EEOC Guidance makes clear that reassignment is 
an “accommodation of last resort,” to be used only when there is no 
available accommodation that will enable the employee to perform the 
essential functions of the current job.
349
 The position must be vacant, 
i.e., no employee must be bumped from a position to make it available to 
an employee with a disability.
350
 Further, the employee must be qualified 
for the vacant position.
351
If more than one vacant position exists, the 
employee should be reassigned to the position closest to the existing job 
in terms of pay, benefits, and working conditions.
352
 The EEOC 
Guidance indicates that the employee need not be the most qualified 
employee for the position in order to be entitled to reassignment.
353
 
Like the EEOC, the courts have found that reassignment of a qualified 
employee to a vacant position is a reasonable accommodation if the 
employee can no longer perform the functions of the current position. 
The courts have struggled with how to accommodate the reassignment 
obligation to other employer policies, however. The Supreme Court 
weighed in on this question in U.S. Airways v. Barnett.
354
 There, the 
Court held that it was not reasonable to reassign an employee with a 
disability to a vacant position where a unilaterally-imposed employer 
                                                     
349. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238, ¶ 24. 
350. Id.  
351. Id. (stating that the employee must be qualified and the employer has no obligation to assist 
the employee in meeting the qualifications). 
352. Id. 
353. Id. 
354. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
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seniority system would award that job to another employee.
355
 Thus, in 
any workplace with a seniority system, whether imposed by the 
employer or negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement, 
reassignment is unavailable unless the limited exception left open by the 
court is met.
356
 
The plaintiff might show, for example, that the employer, having 
retained the right to change the seniority system unilaterally, 
exercises that right fairly frequently, reducing employee 
expectations that the system will be followed—to the point 
where one more departure, needed to accommodate an 
individual with a disability, will not likely make a difference. 
The plaintiff might show that the system already contains 
exceptions such that, in the circumstances, one further exception 
is unlikely to matter. We do not mean these examples to exhaust 
the kinds of showings that a plaintiff might make. But we do 
mean to say that the plaintiff must bear the burden of showing 
special circumstances that make an exception from the seniority 
system reasonable in the particular case.
357
 
Although the EEOC Guidance says the employee need not be the 
most qualified for the position, courts have struggled with the question 
of whether an employer must award a vacant position to an employee 
needing accommodation if a more qualified applicant is available. The 
courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have split.
358
 Huber v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
359
 and Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.
360
 illustrate 
the two positions. The court in Huber concluded that an employer policy 
                                                     
355. Id. at 406. 
356. Of course, an employer—or in the case of a collective bargaining agreement, an employer 
and a union—could agree to make an exception to the seniority system for the employee needing 
accommodation. In the case of a unilateral system, there is little risk to the employer making an 
exception barring the unlikely situation where the system is contractually binding. In the case of a 
collective bargaining agreement, however, an employer and union might be sued for breach of 
contract and breach of the duty of fair representation by an employee who did not receive the 
position due to the accommodation. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
357. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405–06. 
358. Compare Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(“We . . . conclude the ADA is not an affirmative action statute and does not require an employer to 
reassign a qualified disabled employee to a vacant position when such a reassignment would violate 
a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy of the employer to hire the most qualified candidate.” 
(citations omitted)), with EEOC v. United Airlines, 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that 
reassignment to a vacant position would be a reasonable accommodation absent undue hardship and 
finding a policy of appointing the most qualified person to the position is not, without more, undue 
hardship). 
359. 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2008). 
360. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
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to hire the most qualified individual was analogous to a seniority system 
and therefore reassignment would constitute undue hardship.
361
 In Smith, 
however, the court found that absent undue hardship, the employer must 
reassign an employee who could not perform the current job with 
accommodation to an open position for which the employee was 
qualified.
362
 The existence of more qualified candidates for the vacant 
position does not relieve the obligation to accommodate by 
reassignment.
363
 The court noted that requiring only that the individual 
be allowed to compete with others for the open position on the basis of 
qualification would not be an accommodation at all, because the 
nondiscrimination provisions of the ADA require equal consideration.
364
 
Given that the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in one of the 
cases, this split in the courts is unlikely to be resolved soon.
365
 
Other employer policies, such as those limiting transfers and light 
duty assignments, might also impede reassignment. Some employers bar 
transfers completely, while others deny them to probationary employees 
or allow them only within the employee’s current department, facility, or 
other work unit.
366
 The EEOC’s position is that such policies do not, 
without more, properly limit the reassignment obligation.
367
The 
employer must make a specific showing of undue hardship in the 
                                                     
361. 486 F.3d at 483. 
362. 180 F.3d at 1169 (“If no reasonable accommodation can keep the employee in his or her 
existing job, then the reasonable accommodation may require reassignment to a vacant position so 
long as the employee is qualified for the job and it does not impose an undue burden on the 
employer.”). 
363. Id. (“Anything more, such as requiring the reassigned employee to be the best qualified 
employee for the vacant job, is judicial gloss unwarranted by the statutory language or its legislative 
history.”). 
364. Id. at 1164–65. 
365. United Airlines, Inc. v. EEOC, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013). The Seventh Circuit in 
United Airlines overruled its earlier decision in EEOC v. Humiston–Keeling, 227 F.3d 1024 (7th 
Cir. 2000), a case on which the Eighth Circuit relied in Huber v. Wal-Mart, 486 F.3d at 483. EEOC 
v. United Airlines, 693 F.3d 760, 761, 764–65 (7th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Huber, 552 U.S. 1074 (2007), but dismissed the petition after a settlement. 552 U.S. 
1136 (2008). Given these facts, the continued force of Huber and the argument that an employer can 
apply a policy of choosing the most qualified applicant to avoid reassigning a qualified individual 
with a disability is questionable. 
366. See, e.g., United States v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (D. Colo. 1997) 
(finding that policy of not transferring police officers to non-police positions did not bar transfer as 
accommodation); Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 398 (E.D. Tex. 1995) 
(finding that employer that did not transfer employees between facilities need not transfer disabled 
employee); ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238, ¶¶ 24–25 (stating that employer policy of 
not transferring probationary employees does not justify failure to transfer probationary employee 
as an accommodation). 
367. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238, ¶¶ 24–27. 
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particular situation and cannot simply rely on policies to establish undue 
hardship. Courts have not always agreed with the EEOC position, in 
some cases finding that an employer need not modify policies to allow 
reassignment of disabled employees.
368
 
As for light duty accommodations, courts have approved employer 
policies reserving light duty jobs for individuals with temporary 
disabilities, refusing to require employers to assign individuals with 
disabilities to such jobs on a permanent basis.
369
 Where an employer has 
provided light duty in some situations, however, courts have found it to 
be a reasonable accommodation.
370
 Some courts have also found that 
where an employer has a policy of rotating employees through jobs, the 
employer need not provide a permanent assignment to a light duty 
position for an employee who cannot do all the jobs in a rotation.
371
 
While in some cases these policies limiting light duty and transfers 
may be essential, as in the case of other accommodations requiring 
structural changes in the workplace, some courts seem to accept without 
serious scrutiny the employer’s representation that they are necessary.372 
Requiring an employer to prove that making an exception to such a 
policy would cause undue hardship would make it easier for cancer 
survivors to retain employment.
373
 
                                                     
368. See, e.g., Emrick, 875 F. Supp. at 398 (finding that employer that did not transfer employees 
between facilities need not transfer disabled employee). 
369. See, e.g., Josey v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., No. 0:11-CA-02993-CMC-SVH, 2013 WL 
5566035, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 8, 2013), aff’d per curium, 566 F. App’x 209 (4th Cir. 2014); Watson v. 
Lithonia Lighting, 304 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2002); Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 
1999).  
370. See, e.g., Gibson v. Milwaukee Cnty., No. 12-CV-00657, 2015 WL 998249, at *9–10 (E.D. 
Wis. Mar. 5, 2015) (following EEOC guidance and requiring that employee with disability must be 
offered light duty that was offered to individuals with on-the-job injuries); Leslie v. St. Vincent 
New Hope, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 879, 888 (S.D. Ind. 1996); cf. Young v. United Parcel Serv., __ U.S. 
__, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). There, the Supreme Court found that an employee can establish a 
violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by proving that an employer policy imposes 
significant burdens on pregnant workers without sufficiently strong nondiscriminatory reasons, 
leading to an inference of intentional discrimination. Id. at 1354–55. The “plaintiff can create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that 
the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to 
accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers.” Id. at 1354. 
371. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Oakland Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719, 729–31 (6th Cir. 2000); 
England v. ENBI Ind., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1013–14 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
372. The court in Emrick concluded that an employer need not transfer a disabled employee to 
another facility unless it has a practice of such transfers without inquiring whether such a transfer 
would be reasonable or create undue hardship. 875 F. Supp. at 398. Other courts have accepted this 
conclusion as well, citing Emrick. See Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 
(S.D. Iowa 2002); Munoz v. H & M Wholesale, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 596, 608 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
373. See Stone v. City of Mt. Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 100-01 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing summary 
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In summary, employees seeking reassignment as an accommodation 
may be limited in many ways, including the lack of available positions 
for which they are qualified and the existence of a seniority system. 
Further, in some jurisdictions reassignment may be limited by the 
court’s conclusion that individuals deemed more qualified by the 
employer can be hired in preference to reassigning the cancer survivor. 
Finally, courts that do not require accommodations in the face of rigid 
employer policies limiting transfers or light duty will also adversely 
affect the ability of survivors to retain employment. While reassignment 
may work for some cancer survivors, the limitations on this 
accommodation restrict its utility. 
D. The FMLA, the ADA, and Cancer 
This review of the ADA and FMLA demonstrates several limitations 
that adversely affect cancer survivors. Both statutes are limited in 
coverage, excluding many workers including those at smaller employers 
and, for the FMLA, employees with shorter tenure with the employer.
374
 
Additionally, the limited length and flexibility of available leaves and 
the absence of required paid leaves do not meet the needs of many 
cancer survivors.
375
 The judicial tendency to accept the employer’s 
structural requirements, such as attendance and transfer rules, work 
hours and work location, as essential functions of the job also restricts 
the utility of the accommodation requirement.
376
 While some jobs 
certainly mandate that the employee work particular hours or at a 
particular location, courts have been reluctant to dig into such 
requirements to determine their necessity. The limits on reassignment as 
an accommodation, requiring the employee to be qualified and the 
position to be vacant, as well as the position of some courts that a more 
qualified individual can be lawfully hired, restrict the potential for 
reassignment as an effective accommodation.
377
 
Because the relationship between cancer survivors and work is 
                                                     
judgment in favor of an employer that had a policy of assigning only employees injured on the job 
and employees with temporary off the job injuries to particular light duty positions, finding that was 
insufficient to establish as a matter of law that assignment of employee with permanent off duty 
injury would not be a reasonable accommodation). 
374. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2012) (defining employer under the ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) 
(2012) (defining eligible employee under the FMLA); id. § 2611(4) (defining eligible employer 
under the FMLA); supra notes 135–37, 148–49, 160 and accompanying text. 
375. See supra notes 150–58, 233–88 and accompanying text. 
376. See supra notes 301, 330–38, 366–73 and accompanying text. 
377. See supra notes 349–51, 358–65 and accompanying text. 
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complex and variable, the solutions to the issues faced by cancer patients 
must also be varied. The two primary statutes reviewed here focus on a 
discrimination/accommodation model of dealing with individuals in the 
workplace with health issues. As Professor Bagenstos has pointed out 
with regard to individuals with disabilities in general, this model has its 
limitations and cannot alone address the issues of disability and 
employment.
378
 “Social welfare interventions” are also necessary.379 Yet 
it is possible to make some broad recommendations for changes to fill 
gaps left by the FMLA and ADA that would enable more survivors to 
maintain or obtain employment. These changes must be part of a bigger 
picture, however, which cannot be complete without further analysis of 
other laws. 
First, it may be helpful to review briefly the normative goals 
discussed earlier. Maintaining employment benefits both survivors and 
employers. For employees, it provides income and access to medical 
treatment, along with psychosocial benefits. Keeping existing 
employment, if possible, is preferable to termination and later 
reemployment for two reasons. Hiring discrimination is difficult to prove 
and gaps in employment must be explained. Additionally, changing 
employment may require changing insurance, which can create 
difficulties in obtaining necessary medical treatment.
380
 For employers, 
employee turnover is costly.
381
Thus, the goal of the changes 
recommended below is to enable employees to retain employment where 
they are able to continue working. 
Nonetheless, if it were easier to obtain employment after leaving a 
                                                     
378. BAGENSTOS, supra note 219, at 136. 
379. Id. 
380. Continuing insurance through COBRA, where possible, is expensive and unaffordable for 
many who lose employment. Other options such as insurance on the private market, even if 
subsidized and thus affordable, could require changing treatment providers and interfere with 
treatment protocols.  
381. Of course, absenteeism is also costly, as is health insurance. In a given case, the cost of 
retaining a particular employee with cancer could outweigh the replacement cost. The law already 
makes some choices in this area, however, by prohibiting discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities and requiring leaves of limited duration. See supra notes 135–37, 159–61. Expanded 
protection could impose additional costs on employers. At the same time, costs of disability benefits 
will be reduced. Depending on the source of the benefits, however, this reduction may not directly 
affect the employer. Continued employment will also reduce costs for any other public benefits to 
which the unemployed survivor might be entitled. Additionally the choice to link health insurance 
and employment imposes this cost on employers, contrary to the decisions made by most other 
developed countries, which provide health care largely through public financing. See Sharon M. 
McManus & Khi V. Thai, Health Care Financing: A Comparative Analysis, 7 PUB. BUDGETING & 
FIN. MGMT. 279, 286 (1995). Disability benefits and health insurance will be treated in future 
articles. 
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prior job due to cancer, maintaining employment would be somewhat 
less significant. Implementation of Professor Bagenstos’ 
recommendations to ease proof of hiring discrimination under the ADA 
would be beneficial for cancer survivors.
382
 These recommendations 
include the following: increasing available damages to encourage 
attorneys to represent workers alleging hiring discrimination; increasing 
EEOC enforcement activity focused on hiring cases; and using testers—
individuals who apply for employment to test for discrimination, rather 
than to actually obtain the job—to identify hiring discrimination.383 
While these changes would benefit all individuals with disabilities, a 
focus on FMLA leave and ADA accommodations also holds potential 
for improving employment for survivors. 
Studies of the FMLA demonstrate that it has not created major 
problems for most employers. While the limitations on coverage 
recognized that absences create more difficulties for smaller employers, 
the ADA already requires employers with fifteen or more employees to 
accommodate absences and some state laws require smaller employers 
to provide leave.
384
The ADA standard is more flexible than the FMLA, 
and thus less predictable for employers and employees. Also, courts 
interpreting the ADA have been inconsistent at best in finding 
intermittent leaves to be a reasonable accommodation. For employees 
with treatment regimens of chemotherapy and radiation, intermittent 
leave is a crucial accommodation. Decreasing the FMLA coverage limit 
to twenty-five employees would guarantee more employees the 
availability of predictable and intermittent leave.
385
 While decreasing the 
coverage limit would impose some costs on smaller employers, it would 
also have all of the benefits of increasing employment for individuals 
with cancer and others with serious illnesses. Similarly, reducing the 
qualifying period for leave to six months of employment and reducing 
                                                     
382. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 219, at 132–35. 
383. Id. 
384. The family and medical leave laws of the District of Columbia, Oregon, Washington, and 
Vermont all cover smaller employers. See State Family and Medical Leave Laws, supra note 148. 
385. The National Partnership for Women and Families indicates that this change would expand 
coverage to 8.5 million more employees. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, UPDATING THE 
FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/Updating_the_FMLA_Fact_Sheet.pdf. The Abt 
Associates study estimates that while 59.2% of employees are currently eligible for FMLA leave, 
reducing the employee coverage number to thirty would increase that percentage to 63% while 
reducing it to twenty would increase the percentage to 67%. ABT ASSOC., supra note 146, at ii. The 
key employee exception allows employers to exempt certain highly paid salaried employees if 
preserving the job would cause “substantial and grievous economic injury” to an employer, which 
provides some protection for employers. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.217–.219 (2014). 
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the work hours requirement for coverage to include more part-time 
workers would aid many cancer patients.
386
 While the one-year 
qualification time period ensures commitment of the employee and 
employer to one another before requiring leave, it substantially burdens 
employees, like Sarah, who are diagnosed with cancer after a job 
change. A six-month period requires some commitment, but protects 
many more employees. And part-time workers may be as committed to 
an employer as fulltime workers, particularly given the increasing 
prevalence of part-time work. Additionally, women predominate in part-
time employment,
387
 often because they are caregivers. Since many 
women are cancer survivors,
388
 expanded protections for part-time 
workers would benefit female caregivers who often are in particularly 
precarious financial positions. 
Extending the amount of FMLA leave would also benefit survivors, 
as many suffer the effects of cancer and its treatment for longer than 
twelve weeks, calculated on either an intermittent or fulltime basis. The 
ADA already requires extending FMLA leave where additional leave is 
reasonable and does not cause undue hardship.
389
 The unpredictability of 
the ADA, however, could be alleviated by a requirement of additional 
mandated leave under the FMLA with perhaps an exception that allowed 
an employer to demonstrate unusual circumstances that made it 
extremely difficult or impossible to cover the employee’s responsibilities 
for the term of the additional leave.
390
 
Additionally, requiring some sort of paid leave would be of enormous 
benefit, particularly to lower wage workers. While some employees, like 
Sarah, have paid leave as a voluntary employee benefit, many do not.
391
 
                                                     
386. Some states, including Connecticut, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, Oregon, 
Washington, and Wisconsin, already have leave laws with shorter employment requirements, 
reduced work hours requirements or both. State Family and Medical Leave Laws, supra note 148. 
Abt Associates estimates that reducing the required work hours from the current 1250 to 780 would 
increase the percentage of eligible employees from 59.2 to 63. ABT ASSOC., supra note 146, at 21–
23. 
387. See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Table A-6. Employed and 
Unemployed Full- and Part-Time Workers By Sex and Age, Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU LAB. 
STAT., http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseea06.htm (last updated August 7, 2015). 
388. See FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 11, at 10–11 (showing breast cancer as leading cause of 
new cancers in women with eighty-nine percent survival rate over five years from diagnosis). 
389. See supra notes 235, 265–75 and accompanying text.  
390. This could be an expansion of the key employee provision, see supra note 385, available 
only for the extended leave time. 
391. Employees with lower educational attainment are less likely to have paid leave. See, e.g., 
HELENE JORGENSEN & EILEEN APPELBAUM, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, DOCUMENTING 
THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE PROGRAM: EVIDENCE FROM THE 2012 
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A study of employers covered by the Connecticut paid leave law showed 
that the law had little-to-no business impact, despite predictions by 
business owners prior to passage.
392
 More than three-quarters of 
employers surveyed supported the law a year and a half after passage, 
with many reporting positive benefits such as improved morale, loyalty, 
and motivation.
393
 The employers reported little abuse of the leave and 
found that many employees did not take all of the leave provided.
394
 
Further, the authors found that employment in the covered industries 
increased while employment in the exempted manufacturing industry 
actually decreased, belying claims that the mandated benefit would 
reduce employment.
395
 This survey was more heavily weighted toward 
the larger employers covered by the law.
396
 
An earlier survey with a lower response rate found more negative 
responses from employers.
397
 Sixty-nine percent of employers in that 
survey indicated the law was not good for their business.
398
 Forty-seven 
percent of the responding employers indicated that they had taken 
actions such as raising prices, reducing wages and benefits, or cutting 
employment to pay the costs of the requisite paid leave.
399
 These mixed 
results may be explained by the timing of the surveys or by differences 
in employers sampled. It is possible that as employers had more 
experience with the law, their objections and negative reactions 
subsided. 
                                                     
FMLA SURVEY 4 (2014), available at http://www.cepr.net/publications/reports/documenting-the-
need-for-a-national-paid-family-and-medical-leave-program-evidence-from-the-2012-fmla-survey. 
These employees are also likely to have fewer financial resources that would enable them to take an 
unpaid leave. Id. 
392. EILEEN APPELBAUM ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, GOOD FOR BUSINESS? 
CONNECTICUT’S PAID SICK LEAVE LAW 1, 11, 18 (2014), available at http://www.cepr.net/ 
documents/good-for-buisness-2014-02-21.pdf.  
393. Id. at 15.  
394. Id. at 9, 16–17. 
395. Id. at 4. 
396. Id. at 3. 
397. See generally MICHAEL SALTSMAN, EMP’T POLICIES INST., PAID SICK LEAVE IN 
CONNECTICUT: A PILOT STUDY OF BUSINESSES RESPONSES TO THE LAW 5–6 (2013), available at 
https://www.epionline.org/studies/paid-sick-leave-in-connecticut/. 
398. Id. at 4. A survey of Seattle service employers covered by that city’s mandated leave law 
also found that more than half believed it would increase their cost of doing business one year after 
the law’s effective date. EMP’T POLICIES INST., PAID SICK LEAVE IN SEATTLE: EXAMINING THE 
IMPACT ON THE SERVICE INDUSTRY 2 (2013) [hereinafter PAID SICK LEAVE IN SEATTLE], available 
at https://www.epionline.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/130801_EPI_PolicyBrief_final1.pdf. 
399. SALTSMAN, supra note 397, at 7. About twenty percent of Seattle employers surveyed 
reported taking such actions in response to the law. PAID SICK LEAVE IN SEATTLE, supra note 398, 
at 3.  
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The Connecticut leave law, like the current local paid leave laws, 
provides limited leave of only five days per year paid directly by the 
employer.
400
 In addition, it covers only certain industries and employers 
with more than fifty workers.
401
 Workers for covered employers begin to 
accrue leave after 680 hours of employment, and part-time workers as 
well as full-time workers are eligible for leave.
402
 This may not be a 
perfect predictor for the impact of a broader paid leave law because of 
the law’s restricted applicability. Many of the covered employers already 
provided paid leave to some employees, limiting the additional 
impact.
403
 And while any paid leave will help cancer patients, most will 
need far more than five days of leave for cancer treatment. Nevertheless, 
the limited Connecticut study and the study of the FMLA provide some 
evidence that employers adjust to additional leave requirements and such 
requirements provide benefits to employers as well. Additionally, 
evidence from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that paid sick 
leave costs for private employers average only $0.26 per hour,
404
 and 
significantly less in the lower paid service occupations.
405
 While when 
considered per employee per hour the costs add up, they are a fraction of 
the cost of total employee benefits, which averages $9.60 per hour.
406
 
Paid leave could be provided in a number of ways. The FMLA could 
mandate pay for some or all of the available leave, or the ADA could 
require paid leave as an accommodation. Both options would require 
statutory amendment and impose direct costs on employers.
407
 
Alternatively, a separate paid leave law could be enacted similar to those 
in Connecticut and a few other states and municipalities. The law could 
require the employer to pay the employee either all or some portion of 
                                                     
400. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 392, at 3. 
401. Id. (describing coverage of only about 287,000 of Connecticut’s 1.7 million employees 
because of industry and size limitations). 
402. Id. 
403. Id. at 7 (stating that approximately 88.5% of employers had offered up to five days of sick 
leave). 
404. News Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Cost for Employee 
Compensation–December 2014, at 1 (Mar. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Employer Cost], available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_03112015.pdf.  
405. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Paid Sick Leave in the United States, 2 PROGRAM PERSP., 
Mar. 2010, at 3, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/program_perspectives_ 
vol2_issue2.pdf.  
406. Employer Cost, supra note 404, at 1.  
407. The Healthy Families Act, which has been introduced into Congress, would require paid 
leave of up to seven days per year for employees who work for employers with fifteen or more 
employees. See The Healthy Families Act, S. 631, H.R. 1286, 113th Cong. (2013). Seven days is 
insufficient for most cancer survivors, although some paid leave is better than none.  
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regular wages during time off. 
An alternative method of providing paid leave is through mandatory 
insurance similar to the unemployment compensation system.
408
 Federal 
law currently allows withdrawal of employee contributions from a 
state’s unemployment insurance fund for temporary disability 
payments.
409
 California has such a system providing partial wage 
replacement for up to fifty-two weeks when an employee is unable to 
work as a result of a non-work-related illness or injury.
410
 The system 
also provides payment for workers who suffer reduced hours or reduced 
wages due to a job change necessitated by a disability.
411
 This disability 
insurance aids employees in retaining employment and maintaining the 
ability to pay for living expenses and treatment. The system would need 
to be integrated with paid leave voluntarily provided by employers and 
with the social security disability system, which provides benefits only 
to those totally and permanently disabled for at least a year.
412
It could be 
implemented at the federal level, by states, or a combination federal and 
state system like the unemployment compensation system funded by a 
tax on employers and/or employees. While a system funded by employer 
taxes would impose costs on employers, as in the case of unemployment 
compensation, there would be resulting economic benefits as these funds 
will go into the economy in the form of housing costs, food costs, 
                                                     
408. Such a bill has been introduced in Congress as the FAMILY Act, which would provide 
twelve weeks of partial wage replacement for most workers through a trust funded by employer and 
employee contributions. Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act, H.R. 1439, 114th Cong. (2015). 
The law would reimburse employees on leave sixty-six percent of their wages up to a maximum of 
$4000 per month. JORGENSEN & APPELBAUM, supra note 391, at 8 (describing the same bill from 
an earlier Congress); see also ABT ASSOC., supra note 146, at 1–4 (describing earlier bills and a 
federal budget proposal with similar goals). 
409. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 244, at 8–1. 
410. For a description of the benefits of the system, see State Disability Insurance, STATE CAL. 
EMP. DEV. DEPARTMENT, http://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2015); CAL. 
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2653 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). Four other states, along with 
Puerto Rico, have similar disability insurance provisions: Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and 
Rhode Island. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 244, at 8-1. 
411. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2656(a); Part-time Worker/Intermittent/Reduced Work Schedules, 
STATE CAL. EMP. DEV. DEPARTMENT, http://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/Part-time_ 
Intermittent_Reduced_Work_Schedule.htm (last visited June 28, 2013). 
412. UMAR MOULTA-ALI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32279, PRIMER ON DISABILITY BENEFITS: 
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY BENEFITS (SSDI) AND SOCIAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI) 3 (2013), 
available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2152&context= 
key_workplace. There is certainly overlap between paid sick leave and disability benefits, which 
come in both public and private forms. There is no clear line between the two. Paid sick leave can 
be used for illnesses and injuries that would not be considered disabilities, at least under most legal 
definitions, as well as those that are clearly disabilities. Disability benefits for cancer survivors will 
be further considered in a future article. 
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medical costs, and other living expenses. California employers have 
reported additional benefits as well, such as reductions in turnover and 
reductions in the use of employer benefit programs.
413
 Further, the costs 
of mandatory insurance may potentially be paid in the form of reduced 
wages for employees.
414
 Another advantage of the mandatory insurance 
approach is that these systems typically cover smaller employers and 
provide more leave, albeit at reduced income, than laws that require 
employers to provide paid sick leave. 
Providing paid leave for illness would align the United States with the 
majority of developed countries, which already offer paid leave, either 
through the employer, a social insurance program, or a combination of 
the two.
415
 While the amount of leave and the percentage of income 
replaced varies, a study of twenty-two developed countries around the 
world revealed that the United States is the only country that did not 
guarantee some paid leave for an employee with a fifty day absence for 
cancer treatment.
416
 Six of the countries studied actually provided more 
protection to low wage workers than to the typical worker,
417
 which is 
particularly significant because low wage workers in the United States 
are often the least protected by the existing laws and employer 
policies.
418
 The United States might look to the laws in these other 
countries as models. 
The other important change that would benefit cancer patients is in 
the determination of employee qualifications and assessment of 
accommodations. As a general rule, the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance 
properly interprets the statute in light of its purposes. If the courts gave 
more weight to that guidance, it would aid employees seeking 
accommodations.
419
 For example, courts should not use the qualification 
                                                     
413. JORGENSEN & APPELBAUM, supra note 391, at 9. 
414. See James Chelius, Book Review, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 199, 200 (1992) (reviewing 
Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS: WAGES, 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY (1990)) (discussing how employer-provided 
insurance may result in a wage offset). 
415. JODY HEYMANN ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, CONTAGION NATION: A 
COMPARISON OF PAID SICK DAY POLICIES IN 22 COUNTRIES 5–7 (2009), available at 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/paid-sick-days-2009-05.pdf. 
416. Id. at 9–10. 
417. Id. at 9. 
418. Id. at 12–13; see supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. 
419. The level of deference due to the EEOC’s interpretations of the statute is not absolutely 
clear. See Travis, supra note 330, at 68. Hoffman’s analysis of the cancer cases prior to 2000 
revealed that courts that failed to defer to the EEOC’s interpretation of the law or to the legislative 
history of the statute were more likely to rule for defendants. Hoffman, supra note 166, at 410–11. 
This insight remains true fourteen years later. 
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standard to avoid dealing with the reasonableness of accommodations or 
the question of undue hardship.
420
 The statute clearly contemplates 
changes in the workplace to accommodate disabilities, including 
modification of work schedules.
421
 The job functions are the tasks 
required to do the job, not the method, time, or place of performing such 
tasks. If the employee proves that he or she can do the tasks required 
with or without accommodation, then the employer must prove that 
changing shifts, work schedules, or similar modifications would cause 
undue hardship.
422
 Inability to work the standard shift or schedule does 
not automatically render the employee unqualified. Analyzing these 
cases as the EEOC suggests, and as some courts have done, to focus on 
whether the employee’s request for an altered work schedule or extended 
leave creates undue hardship will enable more cancer survivors to 
remain employed. The same is true of policies that limit reassignment, 
such as restrictions on light duty or transfers. 
As scholars who have studied these cases in-depth recognize, courts 
are more likely to mandate accommodations such as assistive technology 
than those that require changes in workplace structures. But to 
accommodate cancer survivors effectively, courts must recognize that 
workplace structures and policies are not sacrosanct but merely 
institutionalized practices that must yield to disability accommodations 
under the ADA.
423
 Courts that uphold these structures as inviolable or as 
essential functions of the job defer too quickly to the employer’s existing 
methods of operation. While the EEOC regulations properly recognize 
that the employer’s judgment is one factor in determining the essential 
functions of the job,
424
 it is only one factor and, as noted above 
compliance with policies or job structures should not be considered job 
functions.
425
 Instead, courts should determine whether noncompliance 
                                                     
420. Porter, supra note 189, at 16; Travis, supra note 330, at 58–72. 
421. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (2004); Travis, supra note 330, at 62 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000)); ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238, ¶¶ 22–23. 
422. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238, ¶ 46. 
423. See generally ALBISTON, supra note 338, at 55–68. 
424. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i) (2014).  
425. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (defining essential functions); EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 2.3(a)(3)(b) (1992) (“In identifying an essential function to 
determine if an individual with a disability is qualified, the employer should focus on the purpose of 
the function and the result to be accomplished, rather than the manner in which the function 
presently is performed. An individual with a disability may be qualified to perform the function if 
an accommodation would enable this person to perform the job in a different way, and the 
accommodation does not impose an undue hardship. Although it may be essential that a function be 
performed, frequently it is not essential that it be performed in a particular way.”). 
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with policies or altered job structures create undue hardship. 
Of course, there are accommodations that simply will not work. The 
employer cannot accommodate an employee who drives a bus by 
allowing her to arrive late, causing the bus to be off schedule. But such 
cases will founder on the undue hardship prong. On the other hand, 
perhaps a change to a bus that runs on a different schedule would allow 
this hypothetical plaintiff to continue working. 
Physical attendance should not be required where it is not truly 
necessary and where some or all of the work can be done at home.
426
 
And given advances in technology, working from home is more possible 
in many jobs, including those where interaction with fellow employees 
or customers is necessary.
427
 Courts must not unquestioningly defer to 
employer claims that jobs requiring supervision, teamwork, or 
communication with employees or customers always require physical 
presence in the workplace. With today’s communication technology, 
teamwork and supervision can easily occur remotely in many jobs. 
In considering accommodations, courts must be willing to give 
sufficient weight to the value of retaining an employee with a medical 
condition that is temporarily disabling. For example, many 
accommodations involving assistive technology or equipment may cause 
a slight reduction in efficiency. Such reductions should be tolerated as a 
cost of retaining an employee as retention can benefit both the employer 
and the employee. 
When contemplating reassignment as an accommodation, courts 
should follow the majority of circuits, which, in accord with the EEOC 
Guidance, require employers to reassign qualified employees with 
disabilities despite the presence of more qualified applicants.
428
 Finally, 
the EEOC and the courts should consider the possibility of requiring 
                                                     
426. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 238, ¶ 34. 
427. See Bixby v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 1:10-CV-00405, 2012 WL 832889, at *3, *15 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2012) (denying summary judgment to employer that claimed that management job 
requiring supervision of other employees, facilitating meetings, and coordinating with other 
employees could not be performed at home because direction could be done by e-mail and meetings 
were often conducted by teleconference). 
428. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that a 
policy of hiring the best-qualified applicant does not establish undue hardship barring reassignment 
and directing the district court to consider if ordinarily, mandatory reassignment is a reasonable 
accommodation. If reasonable, the court must conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine if there 
is an undue hardship in the particular case that would make mandatory reassignment unreasonable); 
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1169 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that a 
reasonable accommodation may require reassigning a disabled employee to a vacant position if the 
employee is qualified and reassignment would not be an undue burden to the employer and noting 
that requiring the employee to be the most qualified applicant is “unwarranted”).  
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some training by employers to render employees qualified for 
reassignment.
429
 While such a conclusion might stretch the meaning of 
“qualified individual with a disability,” a relatively short retraining 
period could be considered a reasonable accommodation under the 
statute and might enable some cancer survivors to remain employed. 
E. The Limits of Legal Change 
The recommended legal changes would not resolve all of the needs of 
cancer survivors for employment support. Cancer survivors often cite 
support from the employer and fellow employees as a determinant of 
continued employment.
430
 Where such support comes in the form of 
accommodations such as leave or more flexible work structures, legal 
changes will help. Employer engagement in the interactive process to 
determine appropriate and effective accommodations is also a legal 
requirement that might be deemed support. But the emotional support 
desired by cancer survivors cannot be legally mandated.
431
 Indeed a legal 
mandate that imposes some cost on the employer and fellow employees 
may have exactly the opposite effect, fostering resentment rather than 
support.
432
 
Strong cultural norms support employer control of the workplace and 
existing structures such as work schedules, work assignments, and work 
locations.
433
 Changes to those norms, or even efforts to change those 
                                                     
429. Cf. Craddock v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 533 F. App’x 333, 334, 337 (4th Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam) (reversing dismissal of employee’s complaint of age and disability discrimination based on 
allegations that other employees were trained on a function and had she been trained she could have 
been reassigned to that position). While the allegations in Craddock included a claim that the 
employer had trained others, the suggestion here is that retraining be provided, even when not 
provided to others, if it is not extensive or time consuming and would enable the employee to 
remain employed. To date, courts have not required such training where it is not provided to others. 
See, e.g., Williams v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 253 F.3d 280, 282–83 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding no 
obligation to provide special training not offered to nondisabled employees). While extensive 
training should not be required, relatively brief training could benefit both the employer and 
employee by enabling retention. 
430. See supra notes 111, 113 and accompanying text. 
431. Of course, if failure to support rises to the level of harassment by either supervisors or 
employees, the employee may have a legal claim. See Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 
175–76, 178–79 (4th Cir. 2001) (recognizing hostile environment harassment claim under the ADA 
and finding in favor of plaintiff harassed by supervisors); Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 
168 F.3d 661, 666–67 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing elements of claim for disability-based harassment); 
Bielich v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 589, 603 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Walton, 168 
F.3d at 666–67) (same). 
432. Porter, supra note 189, at 79–81. 
433. See generally ALBISTON, supra note 338 (discussing how laws such as the FMLA, which 
require restructuring of institutional practices, may be thwarted by the existence of persistent 
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norms, may evoke strong reactions that make the workplace less 
welcoming to cancer survivors. These same institutional norms pose 
limits on the effectiveness of legal changes.
434
 They may discourage 
survivors from pursuing claims or even identifying discrimination.
435
 
They encourage courts to limit the law by refusing to require changes in 
existing workplace norms and structures.
436
 Thus, legal change is only 
one part of the effort to increase employment opportunities for cancer 
survivors. Cultural change, both in the workplace and in society, must 
form part of the strategy. Leadership in institutions can facilitate cultural 
change. Cancer does not respect
437
 position or authority, and its ubiquity 
may help foster change. Dialogue between medical, legal, and business 
professionals can also facilitate change. This Article and those that will 
follow seek to enhance that dialogue. 
IV. SARAH’S FATE 
The Article began with an introduction to Sarah, a hypothetical but 
representative individual with cancer. Would the recommended changes 
assist Sarah? The short answer is yes. Under current law Sarah is not 
eligible for FMLA leave. At best she might get leave under the ADA. 
The amount of leave she would be entitled to is uncertain. If the doctors 
cannot give her a definite leave period, she may not be entitled to the 
accommodation. Any leave she obtained beyond two weeks would be 
unpaid. Further, unless her employer continues insurance for other 
leaves, she would not be guaranteed retention of her insurance as if she 
were working. As for her changes in shift, a court might find that 
compliance with her assigned shift is an essential job function. She 
might be able to obtain an accommodation of rest breaks or assistive 
technology, but the rest breaks might be subject to the same argument as 
the shift changes. If she were terminated for poor performance, she 
                                                     
cultural norms). 
434. For an argument about how workplace norms limit legal change benefiting caregivers, see 
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Caregiver Conundrum Redux: The Entrenchment of Structural Norms, 91 
DENV. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2555872. 
435. ALBISTON, supra note 338, at 235–36. This phenomenon may explain the limited numbers 
of survivors that report discrimination despite the low employment numbers. 
436. Id. at 123–33, 237–40; see also supra notes 330–38, 367–68 and accompanying text. 
437. See Joann S. Lublin, Tuesday Morning Corp., Former CEO Settle Lawsuit over Firing, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304049904579516012871293476 (describing settlement of claim that the CEO 
of Tuesday Morning was fired because of her cancer diagnosis).  
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would have to show a discriminatory motivation on the part of the 
employer. 
Under the recommended changes, her fate would be different in 
several respects. The reduction of FMLA eligibility to six months of 
employment would entitle Sarah to at least twelve weeks of unpaid leave 
for her treatment (with two weeks paid based on her employer’s policy). 
If the FMLA were amended to provide for longer leaves subject to 
employer proof that extending the leave would cause severe hardship, 
she could get additional leave. With FMLA leave, her health insurance 
would continue as if she were working. The ADA might also entitle her 
to additional leave. If a paid leave were provided under either statute or 
pursuant to a disability insurance program, Sarah would not only get 
leave for her surgery and recovery but she would have some income 
during that time. If indeed she has performance issues relating to her 
cancer, either accommodations or leave might enable her to maintain 
employment. Further, changing shifts to accommodate her treatment 
schedule would be a required accommodation unless the employer could 
establish undue hardship. As for any termination, she would still have to 
show discriminatory motivation. If hiring cases were easier to prove, 
however, she might have an easier time obtaining a new job after her 
recovery. 
These legal rights would ease, though certainly not eliminate, Sarah’s 
stress. Stress reduction could provide medical and psychosocial benefits 
and might make her treatment easier and her subsequent return to work 
more likely.
438
 These benefits would attach regardless of Sarah’s job, 
type of cancer, or socio-demographic status. In fact, the lower her 
income level, the less likely the employer would be able to show that her 
return from leave was essential, as such employees can more easily be 
replaced with temporary workers. Thus, these changes, with the 
exception of telecommuting, may be of particular benefit to the lower 
income and Latino and African-American workers who are more likely 
to suffer unemployment as a result of cancer. 
                                                     
438. See Charissa Andreotti et al., Cancer, Coping, and Cognition: A Model for the Role of 
Stress-Reactivity in Cancer-Related Cognitive Decline, 24 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 617 (2015) 
(indicating that stress may contribute to cognitive changes in some cancer patients); Richard F. 
Brown et al., Employee to Employer Communication Skills: Balancing Cancer Treatment and 
Employment, 22 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 426, 432 (2014) (showing that educating cancer patients 
about their legal rights and communication skills improved their confidence regarding 
communicating with their employer about their needs related to their cancer treatment); Attitudes 
and Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatmentsandsideeffects/ 
emotionalsideeffects/attitudes-and-cancer (last visited Aug. 28, 2015) (indicating that it is not clear 
that stress reduction, therapy, and emotional support impact survival but can improve quality of life 
and help patients and families manage treatment). 
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CONCLUSION 
Analyzing the research on cancer and employment provides valuable 
information about how to ensure that cancer survivors who are willing 
and able to work during and after treatment can maintain employment. 
Viewing the FMLA and ADA through this lens shows the strengths and 
limitations of those laws. The recent amendments to the ADA have 
benefited cancer survivors by making clear that they are individuals with 
disabilities covered by the law. And the FMLA provides, for many 
employees, leave that enables them to access treatment without loss of 
employment. But the two laws have limitations that restrict their utility 
for many cancer survivors. First, many employees are left out because of 
the size of their employer or the duration of their employment. Reducing 
these requirements would cover many more survivors with the 
protections of leave and workplace accommodations. Second, paid leave 
is completely at the discretion of the employer and more often available 
to higher paid employees. A requirement of paid leave would aid 
survivors in keeping their employment, particularly low income workers 
who may otherwise leave employment to be eligible for public benefit 
programs. Extended leave, through either the FMLA or ADA, would 
also benefit many survivors. 
Finally, more judicial deference to EEOC interpretations of the ADA, 
which tend to be more favorable to employees and less deferential to 
existing employer policies and work structures, would benefit cancer 
survivors. An important aspect of this approach is to avoid treating 
compliance with existing policies and structures as essential functions of 
the job, but instead to analyze whether allowing deviation for the 
individual with cancer will cause undue hardship for the employer. 
Modification of the ADA and FMLA will not solve all of the 
problems facing cancer survivors struggling to support themselves and 
their families during and after cancer treatment. Some survivors are 
unable to work for longer periods of time than might reasonably be 
covered by even expanded paid leave. Further, health insurance issues 
are intertwined with employment and merit further exploration, 
particularly in light of the recently enacted Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. Finally, a more supportive culture could both 
encourage employees to remain in the workplace and make legal change 
more likely. This Article only begins the dialogue about how to deal 
with the growing population of cancer survivors in America. 
 
